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Cable Television's Emerging Two-
Way Services: A Dilemma for
Federal and State Regulators
Frank W. Lloyd*
Cable television as an entertainment medium has been the sub-
ject of various federal, state, and local regulatory schemes since its
inception in the 1950's. The introduction of nonvideo two-way cable
services that provide a capacity for responsive data and voice trans-
mission between users of the two-way system has renewed interest in
the appropriate role of government in the regulation of two-way cable
services. Telephone companies in particular have pressed state and
federal regulators to identify cable two-way systems as common carri-
ers and to impose on them two-way cable common carrier regulations.
In this Article Mr. Frank Lloyd discusses actual and possible bases for
federal, state, and local jurisdiction over two-way cable services and
presents an analysis of the attempts of regulatory bodies to impose
common carrier restrictions on these cable systems. Mr. Lloyd argues
that common carrier regulation of nonvideo two-way cable services is
inappropriate because an interactive cable system is analogous to
print publishers subject to first amendment protections, fails to meet
the tests for public utility regulation, is a "nondominant" medium,
and will suffer from premature regulation. He also discusses the an-
ticompetitive motivation of telephone companies that seek to block
the entry of cable into the two-way services market. Mr. Lloyd con-
cludes that preemptive FCC action or federal legislation is needed to
prevent undue regulation from inhibiting cable's development of an
interactive capacity.
I. INTRODUCTION
Debates in legislatures and in administrative agencies about
the role of cable in the communications regulatory scheme have
focused for three decades on the impact of cable television as a
home entertainment video challenger to traditional over-the-air
broadcasting services.1 The recent removal, however, of regulatory
* B.A., 1963, Williams College; M.A., 1964, University of Michigan; LL.B., 1967,
Harvard University. Mr. Lloyd is with the Washington office of Mintz, Levin, Cohn, Ferris,
Glovsky, and Popeo, P.C. The author wishes to acknowledge the contribution of David L.
Nicoll and Diane B. Burstein who researched portions of this Article.
1. For a discussion of the issues debated during the earlier years of cable, see Barrow,
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restrictions on cable pay movie and sports- and imported distant
broadcast signal s offerings has lessened the significance of the
home entertainment video issue. Nevertheless, a new and equally
profound controversy has emerged: the role of cable in the provi-
sion of two-way telecommunications services such as burglar alarm
services, home banking, and interoffice business transmissions, an
area previously the monopoly province of the telephone company.
Federal, state, and local regulators, with predictions that by
1990 two-way cable will pass up to 40 million homes, are beginning
to pay more attention to the role of cable in the provision of two-
way services. In addition, many state public service commissions
and local telephone companies, because many two-way cable ser-
vices are similar to services offered in the past over telephone lines,
seek to impose "common carrier" public utility status on cable op-
erators that offer these two-way services.
Thus, the telephone industry, which already has access to
homes and businesses by wire, may overwhelm the cable industry
before cable has had the opportunity to develop its two-way ser-
vice capability into a mature industry. The telephone companies
now realize that cable with its high channel capacity may be able
to provide not only new nonvideo two-way services, but also may
provide basic data and voice transmissions in which telephone
companies traditionally have held a local distribution monopoly.
Furthermore, cable may be able to provide these transmission ser-
Antitrust and the Regulated Industry: Promoting Competition in Broadcasting, 1964 DUKE
L.J. 282; Chazen & Ross, Federal Regulation of Cable Television: The Visible Hand, 83
HARV. L. REv. 1820 (1970); Ford, Some Current Problems in Broadcast Regulation, 17 FED.
COM. B.J. 76 (1960); Heckman, Diversification of Control of the Media of Mass Communi-
cation-Policy or Fallacy?, 42 GEo. L.J. 378 (1954); Park, Cable Television, UHF Broad-
casting, and FCC Regulatory Policy, 15 J.L. & ECON. 207 (1972); Pearson, Cable: The
Thread by Which Television Competition Hangs, 27 RUTGERS L. REV. 800 (1974); Note,
State Regulation of Radio and Television, 73 HAv. L. REv. 386 (1959); Comment, Federal,
State, and Local Regulation of CATV-After You, Alphonse..., 29 U. Prrr. L. REv. 109
(1967).
2. See Home Box Office v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 829
(1977), in which the court held that FCC regulations restricting cable systems' offerings of
these forms of entertainment violated the first amendment because the FCC failed to show
an important or substantial governmental interest in restricting cable systems and not
broadcasters competing for the same audience.
3. An imported distant broadcast signal reaches the cablecaster from microwave relays
or orbiting communications satellites. The cable system transmits the distant signals to
viewers, expanding their program choices by bringing to them stations out of normal UHF
or VHF reception range. In Malrite T.V. of New York v. FCC, 652 F.2d 1140 (2d Cir. 1981),
cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1143 (1982), the court upheld the FCC's repeal of its distant signal
rules, 47 C.F.R. §§ 76.59(b)-(e), 76.61(b)-(f), 76.63 (1980), because the repeal reflected a
"rational weighing of competing policies." 652 F.2d at 1152.
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vices more cheaply or more efficiently than the phone company can
provide them.
Part II of this Article describes cable's new two-way services
and defines the issue whether federal or state regulators should im-
pose common carrier status on cable's delivery of these new ser-
vices. Part III examines past, present, and proposed future bases
for federal jurisdiction, while Part IV analyzes early attempts by
the FCC to regulate cable's two-way services, describes the re-
sponse of the courts to this FCC regulation, and outlines the pres-
ent state of the law as well as current proposals for imposing com-
mon carrier status on cable two-way services. Part V of the Article
explores the emerging efforts of state and local governments to reg-
ulate cable two-way services. Part VI outlines the arguments
against imposing public utility requirements on cable, and Part
VII concludes with a description of proposed solutions that will
insure cable's ability to develop two-way services without undue
governmental interference.
II. BACKGROUND
A. New Services Offered By Cable in the 1980's
Cable television service began in the 1950's when private en-
trepreneurs recognized cable's ability to bring better reception of
over-the-air television stations to mountainous or rural areas with
limited off-air reception. Cable television became more attractive
in urban areas in the mid-1970's with the launch of domestic com-
munications satellites that allowed cable systems economically to
import more distant television stations-such as Ted Turner's
WTBS in Atlanta-that became known as "Superstations." 4 Na-
tional satellite delivery enabled cable operators to offer new spe-
cialized services including pay entertainment services such as
Home Box Office, Showtime, and the Playboy Channel, all-sports
channels like ESPN, all-news channels such as Cable News Net-
work (CNN), children's services such as Nickelodeon, cultural ser-
vices such as Bravo and ARTS, and services designed for minority
audiences such as Black Entertainment Television and Spanish In-
ternational Network. In addition many cable systems recently ad-
ded networks carrying full time music, weather, or health
information.
4. For a history of the development of cable, see, e.g., Malrite T.V. of New York v.
FCC, 652 F.2d 1140 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1143 (1982); P. MAcAvoY, DEREGU-
LATION OF CABLE TELEVISION (1977).
1983] 1047
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
The two-way broadband capacity of cable allows cable systems
to expand dramatically the individualized services they can offer
home or business customers.6 The expansion of cable system trans-
mission capacity6 and the development of higher-capacity optical
fiber cable with information carried by laser beam7 have led entre-
preneurs to view cable as a means of transmitting many two-way
interactive services-both traditional and exotic.8
Some two-way cable services perform mechanical functions
without a human agent at one or both ends. Such "passive" two-
way services can meet important basic home and business needs
such as security alarm monitoring, which cable systems in a num-
ber of communities presently offer. Sensors sweep smoke detectors,
burglar alarms, and other home security devices in cable homes
every few seconds and changes recorded by the sensors alert local
fire and police departments. Several cities have a system of com-
puterized traffic light control by cable.9 Cable also is experimenting
with remote home and business energy management and meter
reading.
Active two-way services, however, particularly participative
home viewer services, have grabbed the greatest share of media at-
tention. The QUBE system in Columbus, Ohio since 1977 has of-
fered two-way subscriber opinion polling on issues ranging from
program schedules to political candidates. Cable operators are in-
stalling similar interactive systems in other newly franchised cities.
Cable systems can adapt the same hand-held keypad used for
home viewer polling to use for ordering particular programs on a
pay per view basis, for home banking or shopping, or for data base
retrieval. Business can make newspaper text or other individual-
ized software deliveries overnight by cable and load this informa-
tion into storage in home computer terminals. 10 While these per-
5. See SLOAN COMM'N ON CABLE COMMUNICATIONS, ON THE CABLE: THE TELEVISION OF
ABUNDANCE 11-16 (1971) [hereinafter cited as ON THE CABLE].
6. See id. Cable has the potential to expand from the original 12-channel systems to
100 or more channels in major urban areas.
7. Optical fiber cables contain one or more special fibers through which modulated
laser light carries information faster and in less space than possible with traditional copper
or aluminum wires. See CABLEVISION, June 1, 1981, at 158 (new cable technology will bring
two-way service to 28 million homes by 1990).
8. Interactive cable service provides for electronic transmission of information in one
direction ("downstream") and a response in the opposite direction ("upstream"), in contrast
to traditional cable service which does not allow the user to send a responsive upstream
transmission.
9. See Young, The Wired City, N.Y. MAO., May 25, 1981, at 28.
10. See id.
1048 [Vol. 36:1045
TWO-WAY CABLE
sonal services are attracting marketing studies and entrepreneurial
attention, many people believe the largest market for interactive
cable will be interoffice business data transmission.11 Coaxial cable,
which has far greater data carrying capacity than conventional
copper telephone wires, allows companies to send high speed data
from computer to computer and transmit interoffice electronic
mail.
The use of cable for switched voice transmission is the two-
way frontier. MCI Communications, however, a long distance tele-
phone service competitor to AT&T, announced in 1982 that it is
seeking cable partners to bypass telephone companies as the local
distribution loops for its long distance voice service, and that it
planned a cable-voice delivery test over the Omaha, Nebraska
cable system.2
B. The Central Issue: Whether Cable Interactive Services
Should Be Subject To "Common Carrier" Public Utility
Regulation
The local telephone company, facing a competitor for a por-
tion of its business, often raises the arguments for imposing com-
mon carrier status on cable.13 In other cases a service provider such
as a security alarm company requests rulings that cable must offer
nondiscriminatory access at a uniform tariffed rate because the
alarm company fears that the cable company will either exclusively
offer competing alarm services or allow a competitor the exclusive
right to reach homes through the cable conduit. 4 Banks, newspa-
pers, shopping services, and long-distance telecommunication com-
petitors to AT&T also are beginning to claim that some regulatory
body should require cable to provide nondiscriminatory "leased ac-
cess" to all vendors of two-way services desiring to use cable's
pathway to the home or business customer. These companies argue
that a local cable system will not act as a fair gatekeeper but will
be a monopoly bottleneck, excluding others and advancing cable's
11. See, e.g., Cable Gets Ready for Business, Bus. WK. Nov. 22, 1982, at 119; Schley,
Industry Execs Look to Businesses to Fuel Growth of Interactive Cable, MULTICHANNEL
NEWS, Oct. 11, 1982, at 21.
12. See Schley, MCI Chairman Seeks Alliance with Cable, MULTICHANNEL NEWS, Nov.
29, 1982, at 1.
13. See e.g., Cable Television, Mer. Opinion & Order, 49 F.C.C. 2d 1078; infra notes
78-81 and accompanying text.
14. See In re Public Commercial Access to Broadband Cable TV Distribution Systems
for Public Safety Purposes, F.C.C.R.M. 4164; infra notes 108-109 and accompanying text.
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own self interest.15
Proponents of two-way services regulation have not resolved
the issue whether the proper forum for regulation of cable's provi-
sion of these services should be the FCC, state public utility com-
missions, or local government. Several state public utility commis-
sions are actively pursuing these issues, and several groups recently
filed petitions with the FCC advocating federal regulation." In ad-
dition, the Senate has passed a bill that would bar the FCC or
states and municipalities from regulating rates or service require-
ments of any two-way telecommunications facilities or services,
other than "basic telephone service," offered by or over a cable sys-
tem. 17 Telephone companies during the last ten years have ap-
peared before both the FCC and state regulatory bodies seeking
full "common carrier"-like rate and service regulation of cable's in-
teractive services. 18 Some jurisdictional forums are more friendly
than others to telephone company attempts to keep cable from be-
coming a competitive local loop. The telephone companies at this
point seem to have moved these battles into a friendly forum, the
state public utility commissions; the FCC has been less hospitable
to telephone company arguments for similar regulatory protection
against other competitors.'9
Two-way cable television may become a fully competitive ser-
vice in the total broadband communications arena, or its two-way
services may be destined to be only a small portion of a market
that the telephone companies eventually will control. The outcome
of the debate over whether federal or state authorities should im-
pose common carrier-like regulation to provide leased access for
vendors of cable two-way services at tariffed rates may determine
this question.
15. See infra note 104.
16. See infra notes 103-109 and accompanying text. These groups seek to justify FCC
jurisdiction over cable in part because of the alleged monopoly characteristics of cable.
17. Cable Telecommunications Act of 1983, S. 66, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983). Senator
Barry Goldwater (R.-Ariz.) introduced the Act on January 26, 1983. Section 607(c) of this
bill would preclude federal, state, or local regulation of two-way cable services.
18. See infra notes 115-128 and accompanying text; see also Sloan & Baker, AT&T
Versus Cable: War of the Wires, 127 FoRBEs, May 11, 1981, at 204; Broadcast/Phone Hy-
brid Seen as Two-Way Cable Challenger, 18 COM. NEWS, Sept. 1981, at 92.
19. See infra notes 78-86 and accompanying text; see also Comment, Of Common Car-
riage and Cable Access: Deregulation of Cable Television by the Supreme Court, 34 FED.
COM. L. J. 167 (1982).
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III. POTENTIAL MODELS FOR FEDERAL JURISDICTION OVER CABLE
TELEVISION
Title I of the Communications Act of 19340 grants the Federal
Communications Commission plenary jurisdiction over "all inter-
state and foreign communication by wire or radio .... ,,21 Title II
of the Act"2 gives the FCC express authority over communications
common carriers, while Title 11123 governs the FCC's jurisdiction
over users of the electromagnetic radio spectrum. The courts also
have construed the Communications Act to grant the FCC author-
ity under the doctrine of "ancillary jurisdiction" over certain activ-
ities not expressly addressed by either Title II or Title 111.24 This
part will examine each of these potential bases of federal jurisdic-
tion over cable television's two-way services.
A. Title II Jurisdiction Over Common Carriers
1. Definition of Common Carrier
Section 153(h) of the Communications Act defines a "common
carrier" as "any person engaged as a common carrier for hire, in
interstate or foreign communication by wire or radio or interstate
or foreign radio transmission of energy ... but a person engaged
in radio broadcasting shall not . . . be deemed a common car-
rier." 5 Courts have interpreted this circular definition to entail
three elements: First, the FCC or reviewing court must find in the
enterprise a "quasi-public character" because the carrier "under-
takes to carry for all people indifferently."2' Second, business prac-
tice controls the determination of common carrier status. "[A] car-
rier will not be a common carrier where its practice is to make
individualized decisions, in particular cases, whether and on what
20. 47 U.S.C. § 151-156 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
21. 47 U.S.C. § 152(a) (1976).
22. 47 U.S.C. §§ 201-224 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
23. 47 U.S.C. §§ 301-399 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
24. See National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943); see infra
notes 51-70 and accompanying text.
25. 47 U.S.C. § 153(h) (1976); see also Comment, The Proposed Deregulation of Do-
mestic Common Carrier Telecommunications, 69 CALtF. L. REv. 455 (1981).
26. See Semon v. Royal Indemnity Co., 279 F.2d 737, 739 (5th Cir. 1960); see also
National Ass'n of Reg. Util. Comm'rs v. FCC, 525 F.2d 630, 641 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 425
U.S. 992 (1976) (NARUC 1); Home Ins. Co. v. Riddell, 252 F.2d 1, 3 (5th Cir. 1958); Ciaccio
v. New Orleans Pub. Belt R.R., 285 F. Supp. 373, 375 (E.D. La. 1968); State v. Sinclair Pipe
Line Co., 180 Kan. 425, 439, 304 P.2d 930, 941 (1957); Utility Comm'n v. Gulf Atlantic
Towing Corp., 251 N.C. 105, 109, 110 S.E.2d 886, 889 (1959).
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terms to deal."2 Thus, "[a] particular system is a common carrier
by virtue of its functions, rather than because it is declared to be
SO. ''28 Last, the user, not the carrier, chooses the particular intelli-
gence to be transmitted over the system.29
Under this definition the FCC has subjected traditional tele-
phone and telegraph companies to Title II regulation. The courts
have questioned the discretion of the FCC to determine whether a
cable system is acting as a common carrier. The Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit in Philadelphia Television
Broadcasting Co. v. FCCs° upheld the FCC's exercise of its discre-
tion to classify cable systems as "adjuncts of the nation's broad-
casting system." 31 The court stated that this approach was "a ra-
tional and hence permissible choice by the agency, '32 but the
court's opinion seemed to leave room for the FCC to choose com-
mon carrier classification for cable. The Supreme Court, however,
two years later in United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 38 indi-
cated that the FCC had no discretion under the Communications
Act to deem cable systems common carriers. In addition, the D.C.
27. NARUC I, 525 F.2d at 641 (footnote omitted).
28. Id. at 644 (footnote omitted); see also Philadelphia Television Broadcasting Co. v.
FCC, 359 F.2d 282 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (upholding FCC determination that cable systems are
not common carriers).
29. See, e.g., National Ass'n of Reg. Util. Comm'rs v. FCC, 533 F.2d 601, 609 (D.C. Cir.
1976)(NARUC II). The NARUC H court added a fourth element to the definition of com-
mon carrier; a common carrier is under a legal or judicial compulsion to provide nondiscrim-
inatory service. NARUC II, 533 F.2d at 608. The fourth indicia, however, is really a conclu-
sion about the effect of common carrier classification, rather than a means to identify a
common carrier, and results in a circular definition-a system is a common carrier because
it must offer services on a nondiscriminatory basis, and it must offer services on a nondis-
criminatory basis because it is a common carrier.
30. 359 F.2d 282 (D.C. Cir. 1966). The broadcasting company petitioned the FCC to
prevent Rollins Broadcasting, Inc. from constructing and operating a community antenna
television (CATV) system until Rollins complied with the common carrier requirements of
47 U.S.C. §§ 201-222. The court upheld the FCC's dismissal of the petition, rejecting the
petitioner's charge that cable systems are common carriers within the meaning of the Com-
munications Act. The court deferred to the FCC's congressional grant of authority and con-
sidered that the agency's proposed scheme for regulating cable systems as "adjuncts of the
nation's broadcasting system" was more appropriate than common carrier regulation. Id. at
283-84.
31. Id. at 284.
32. Id.
33. 392 U.S. 157 (1968). Petitioners in Southwestern Cable, like those in Philadelphia
Broadcasting, sought FCC regulation of a cable company as a means to preserve their
broadcast market. The Supreme Court stated that "[tihe Commission and the respondents
are agreed, we think properly, that these CATV systems are not common carriers within the
meaning of the [Communications] Act," id. at 169 n.29, but found that the FCC did have
authority to regulate cable as "communication by wire or radio" under 47 U.S.C. § 152(a).
Id. at 178.
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Circuit in 1976 rejected the FCC's claim to "unfettered discretion"
to classify a cable system, stating that a "particular system is a
common carrier by virtue of its functions, rather than because it is
declared to be so."134
Under this functional jurisdictional test, a particular entity
can determine its status as a common carrier by tailoring the man-
ner in which it offers its services. The critical portion of the test
for treatment as a common carrier is whether the cable system
"holds out" its services to all potential customers indifferently. A
cable system will not be a common carrier if it makes individual
decisions, in particular cases, whether and on what terms to pro-
vide particular services. 5 Cable systems, therefore, should examine
each transaction offering two-way services to see if it meets all
parts of the test, particularly whether services are "held out indif-
ferently" to the public. This part of the definition, however, is also
circular, because if an entity is found to be a "common carrier,"
the FCC requires that it must offer services to customers on a non-
discriminatory basis.36
2. The Consequences of Common Carrier Classification
The FCC has comprehensive authority under the Act to regu-
late common carriers. The FCC has direct authority over the types
of common carriage offered, the ownership of transmitting facili-
ties, the conduct of the authorized firm, and the prices charged by
the carrier for its services.3 7 Interstate common carriers are subject
to FCC regulation in two principal areas: (1) authorization of ser-
vice-section 214 of the Communications Act requires a common
carrier to obtain FCC approval based on "present or future public
convenience and necessity" before beginning, expanding, or cutting
back a telecommunications service, 8 and (2) tariff filing-sections
201 through 205 require that common carriers provide service to
any customer upon reasonable request and fie tariffs with the FCC
containing the prices, terms and conditions under which they will
offer telecommunications services. These tariffs must be just, rea-
sonable, and nondiscriminatory. The FCC may prescribe different
prices, terms and conditions if it determines that the public inter-
34. NARUC I, 525 F.2d at 644.
35. NARUC II, 533 F.2d at 608-609; see also Miller & Beals, Regulating Cable Televi-
sion, 57 WASH. L. REv. 85 (1981).
36. See 47 U.S.C. § 202 (1976).
37. See 47 U.S.C. §§ 201, 202, 205, 211, 215, & 218 (1976).
38. 47 U.S.C. § 214 (1976).
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est so requires.39
Competitors or customers may challenge either service author-
ization or tariff filings at the FCC. An interstate common carrier
also must file certain other FCC reports, such as its charter and
incorporation of partnership papers, and annual financial and em-
ployment reports. Carriers must also interconnect with other carri-
ers on demand.40 Thus, if another cable system or a separately li-
censed interstate satellite or radio transmission service wanted to
interconnect with a cable system that had been classified as an in-
terstate common carrier, the FCC might require the "carrier" cable
system to cooperate.
B. Title III Jurisdiction Over Radio Spectrum Users
Title III of the Communications Act provides the FCC with
authority to allocate radio spectrum space among competing users
and to issue licenses to qualified applicants.41 The FCC has broad
administrative discretion to accomplish this allocation and licens-
ing function for "the public convenience, interest, or necessity. '42
The Commission pursuant to this mandate established a broadcast
television licensing scheme to promote the objectives of "local-
ism"'43 and "diversity."'44 The courts have interpreted these objec-
39. 47 U.S.C. §§ 201-205 (1976). Section 201 grants the FCC authority to regulate
common carriers and their charges and contracts in the public interest; § 202 prohibits com-
mon carriers from unjust and unreasonable discrimination in establishing charges and per-
forming services; § 203 requires common carriers to file their charges and schedules with the
FCC; § 204 grants common carriers the right to hearings before the FCC on rates, tariffs,
and services; and § 205 authorizes the FCC to impose on common carriers "just and reason-
able" charges and penalties for failure to comply with FCC regulations.
40. See, e.g., Lincoln Tel. & TeL Co. v. FCC, 659 F.2d 1092 (D.C. Cir. 1981). The court
in Lincoln required the telephone company to connect with MCI Telecommunications be-
cause the FCC had determined the connection would be in the public interest and the tele-
phone company had not shown that the interconnection would harm either its telephone
system or the public interest. Id. at 1105-06.
41. 47 U.S.C. §§ 301-399 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
42. Id. at § 307(a). The FCC pursuant to this section grants television licenses for a
period of up to five years with renewal provisions for five year terms.
43. The FCC recognizes "'the need for adequate reflection in programs of local inter-
est, activities, and talents.'" Note, Cable Television and the First Amendment, 71 COLUM.
L. REv. 1008, 1013 n.48 (1971)(quoting FCC, PUBLIC SERVICE RESPONSIBILITY OF BROADCAST
LICENSEES 37 (1946) [hereinafter cited as PUBLIC SERVIcE RESPoNsIBILITY]); see also CATV,
20 F.C.C.2d 201, 202 (1969).
44. "'It has long been an established policy.., of the Commission that the American
system of broadcasting must serve significant minorities among our population, and the less
dominant needs and tastes which most listeners have from time to time.'" Note, supra note
43, at 1013 n.47 (quoting PUBLIC SERVIcE RsPoNsmmrrY, supra note 43, at 15); see also
CATV, 20 F.C.C.2d at 202.
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tives to justify, in part, FCC rules regarding cable television.45
In furtherance of localism, the FCC has encouraged local, com-
munity-oriented programming service by broadcasters. Spectrum
allocation decisions46 and comparative hearings for new station li-
censes evidence this localism policy. In addition, the FCC in grant-
ing or renewing licenses repeatedly has recognized the need for lo-
cal programming. 47
The "diversity" objective in Title III regulation developed
from Supreme Court cases establishing that the first amendment
requires "the widest possible dissemination of information from di-
verse and antagonistic sources." 8 The FCC has implemented this
principle through restrictions on cross-ownership of broadcast me-
dia that diversify control and encourage diverse programming.49
The FCC under Title III has authority to control some aspects of
programming content, although the Communications Act expressly
forbids the FCC to exercise censorship.50 Congress considers
broadcasting licensees to be public trustees because the licensees
use a public resource-the electromagnetic spectrum-and thus
the Act attaches certain affirmative obligations to the issuance of a
license.5 1
45. See United States v. Midwest Video Corp., 406 U.S. 649 (1972); infra notes 66-70
and accompanying text.
46. See, e.g., Television Assignments, Sixth Report & Order, 17 Fed. Reg. 3905 (1952).
The FCC in devising the Table of Assignments in 1952 for television signals listed as its
highest priorities: (1) "[t]o provide at least one television service to all parts of the United
States," and (2) "[t]o provide each community with at least one television broadcasting sta-
tion." Id. at 167.
47. See, e.g., United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157 (1968) (noting
that importing distant television signals could destroy local programming benefits); Carter
Mountain Transmission Corp., 32 F.C.C. 459 (1962)(the possible demise of a local television
station prompted the FCC to deny a CATV system permission to install a microwave an-
tenna), afl'd, 321 F.2d 359, 364 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 951 (1963).
48. Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945); see also FCC v. National
Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting, 436 U.S. 775, 794-95 (1978)(upholding FCC rule prohibit-
ing cross-ownership of broadcast stations and newspapers in the same community because
common ownership tends to limit sources of information); Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v.
FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969)(FCC order requiring radio station to provide political candi-
date opportunity to respond to personal attack aired on the station properly furthers first
amendment objectives).
49. See 47 C.F.R. § 73.636 (1982). These cross-ownership restrictions promote in-
creased competition in the "marketplace of ideas" and reflect the FCC's commitment to
establishing diversified speech forums.
50. See 47 U.S.C. § 326 (1976); see also FCC v. Midwest Video Corp., 440 U.S. 689,
704 (1979)(holding that the FCC may not deprive cable operators of their discretion regard-
ing use of access channels).
51. See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 383 (1969)(The personal at-
tack and fairness doctrines place affirmative obligations on the broadcast station to present
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 36:1045
C. "Ancillary" Jurisdiction Over Cable Television
The FCC in addition to statutory jurisdiction has authority
over certain aspects of cable communications through ancillary ju-
risdiction, a doctrine that developed in recognition of the unique
aspects of rapidly expanding communications technologies. The
Supreme Court stated in 1943 that "Congress was acting [in 1934]
in a field of regulation which was both new and dynamic .... In
the context of the developing problems to which it was directed,
the Act gave the Commission not niggardly but expansive pow-
ers."' 52 Since Congress did not contemplate cable television at the
time it passed the Communications Act courts have analyzed the
FCC's regulatory jurisdiction over cable television by reference to
this "expansive" grant of power, ancillary to the specifically enu-
merated responsibilities contained in the Act.
While the courts have given this expansive power to the FCC
to regulate new communications technologies, internal jurisdic-
tional constraints within the Communications Act5" and constitu-
tional doctrines developed under the first and fifth amendments 4
fairly opposing and competing viewpoints to the television community.). Specifically, the
FCC imposes program content rules governing political broadcasting, 47 C.F.R. §§ 73.1930-
.1940 (1982), the fairness doctrine, id. at § 73.1910-1.1920, and sponsorship identification, id.
at § 73.1212. Other statutes prohibit broadcasters from airing obscene materials, 18 U.S.C. §
1464 (1976), or information about lotteries, id. at § 1304.
52. National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 219 (1943).
53. See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. § 153(h) (1976)(The FCC may not treat broadcasters as com-
mon carriers.); id. § 152(b) (Supp. IV 1981) (The FCC may not regulate activities of intra-
state common carriers.).
54. The first amendment guarantees of freedom of speech and of the press extend to
television and thus limit the FCC's regulatory power. See, e.g., Hoffer, The Power of the
FCC to Regulate Cable Pay-TV: Jurisdictional and Constitutional Limitations, 53 DEN.
L.J. 477, 490-98 (1976); Kreiss, Deregulation of Cable Television and the Problem of Access
Under the First Amendment, 54 S. CAL. L. Rav. 1001 (1981); Miller & Beals, Regulating
Cable Television, 57 WASH. L. Rav. 85 (1981); Note, supra note 43; Note, Cable Television
and Content Regulation: The FCC, the First Amendment and the Electronic Newspaper,
51 N.Y.U. L. REv. 133, 143-47 (1976). The Court in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395
U.S. 367 (1969), noted that "[i]t is the purpose of the First Amendment to preserve an
uninhaibited marketplace of ideas in which truth will ultimately prevail, rather than to
countenance monopolization of that market, whether it be by the Government itself or a
private licensee." Id. at 390.
The fifth amendment guarantee of due process further limits the FCC's ability to regu-
late cable television. Midwest Video Corp. v. FCC, 571 F.2d 1025, 1057-59 (8th Cir. 1978),
afl'd on other grounds, 440 U.S. 689 (1979). The court stated that the FCC in promulgating
rules "was not at liberty to disregard due process rights of cable operators, or of cable con-
sumers to whom most if not all costs will be passed." Id. at 1057. Cf. Loretto v. Tele-
prompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982) (New York law requiring landlords
to permit cable installation on rental property, while serving a legitimate public purpose,
represented an unconstitutional taking of property without due process.).
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exist to limit the FCC's ability to regulate new technological devel-
opments in communications, including new services using the radio
spectrum or providers that clearly fit the common carrier defini-
tion. Moreover, some technologies, like cable, fall squarely in
neither Title II nor Title III. Cable uses wires, not broadcast spec-
trum,55 and normally does not hold itself out as a carrier to anyone
who wishes to transmit information for a fixed price.
The FCC at various times has chosen to assert that it has no
jurisdiction over cable, based on the inability precisely to place
cable activities under Title II or Title III of the Act; to ask for a
further grant of power from Congress; and at other times to ignore
the jurisdictional distinctions between its broadcast and common
carrier regulatory schemes. This contradictory treatment of cable
jurisdiction by the agency has left cable regulation a muddied area.
Debate over the proper regulatory model for cable originated
in the 1950's. In its first public resolution of the cable issue, the
FCC in 1958 stated that it had no jurisdiction over cable under
either Title II or Title II." The FCC reaffirmed this view in 195957
but also sowed the seeds of future regulation by focusing for the
first time on the impact of cable on local broadcast stations as a
possible basis for jurisdiction.58 This link to FCC broadcasting lo-
calism policies ultimately led the FCC to conclude that federal au-
thorities not only could, but should, regulate cable. The FCC, how-
ever, in the late 1950's still believed that clarifying legislation from
Congress was a necessary precondition to its assertion of jurisdic-
tion, yet Congress never gave the FCC a direct grant of authority
over cable.
The FCC, however, in 1962 in Carter Mountain Transmission
55. Cable systems, however, do rely on the radio spectrum for the delivery of distant
programming by microwave or satellite transmission.
56. See Frontier Broadcasting Co., 24 F.C.C. 251, 255-56 (1958). In Frontier thirteen
broadcast stations filed a complaint with the FCC alleging that cable systems are common
carriers within the meaning of the Communications Act and seeking FCC regulation of the
cable systems on the grounds that cable threatens the economic stability of local broadcast
television stations. The FCC dismissed the action, stating that it did "not believe that
[cable] systems are engaged in performing the service of communications common carriers
within the contemplation of the applicable provisions of the Communications Act." Id. at
253-54.
57. See CATV and TV Repeater Services, 26 F.C.C. 403, 428-29 (1959). The FCC
again held that cable systems are not common carriers for purposes of the Communications
Act "since it is the CATV, rather than the subscriber, who determines what signals are to be
carried on the system." Id. at 427. The FCC acknowledged that cable systems pose a real
threat to local broadcasting stations, but concluded Congress would have to pass appropri-
ate legislation before the agency could regulate cable networks.
58. See id. at 430-31.
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Corp.59 abruptly changed its course. Many cable systems were be-
ginning to do more than simply put up a larger antenna to catch
nearby signals; they were using microwave radio to bring in broad-
cast stations from greater and greater distances. Because micro-
wave relay stations required FCC licenses, the Commission unilat-
erally decided that, in the interest of protecting local broadcasters,
it had the authority to regulate the microwave radio relay stations
used by cable systems. The FCC in Carter Mountain stated that:
[a] grant of common carrier radio facilities requires a finding that the public
interest will be served thereby; certainly the well-being of existing television
facilities is an aspect of this public interest. Thus it is not only appropriate, it
is necessary that we determine whether the use of the facility, applied for
would directly or indirectly bring about the elimination of the only television
transmission or reception service to the public.60
The FCC, however, still believed that it could not regulate under
either Titles II or III of the Communications Act cable systems not
served by microwave radio. Thus, in the face of continued Congres-
sional inaction, the FCC had to devise a new justification for its
jurisdiction over all cable systems.
The FCC in 1966 first clearly articulated a proposed new basis
for its cable jurisdiction, one that survives today. 1 The FCC, rely-
ing on its basic grants of authority in Title I of the Act, sections
152(a) and 153(a), concluded that cable systems engaged in "inter-
state communication by wire. '8 2 The FCC also found general
rulemaking authority in the Act to prevent frustration by cable of
section 307(b), which provides that the FCC shall distribute broad-
cast licenses to communities to "provide a fair, efficient, and equi-
table distribution of service." 63 Thus, the standard for cable regu-
59. 32 F.C.C. 459 (1962), aff'd, 321 F.2d 359 (D.C. Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S.
951 (1963).
60. Id. at 461. The FCC based on this reasoning denied a cable system's application
for a permit to install a microwave radio relay to pick up distant television signals, thus
implicitly adopting the Auxilliary Services rationale that protecting the interests of local
broadcasting systems justified cable regulation.
61. CATV, 2 F.C.C.2d 725, 728-34 (1966). FCC concern with the potential adverse ef-
fects of rapid cable development triggered the issuing of this report and order. The FCC
noted that the "removal of the present uncertainty [concerning cable regulation] would as-
sist local franchising authorities, as well as franchise applicants." Id. at 728.
62. Id. at 730. Sections 152(a) and 153(a) of Title 47 allow the FCC to regulate all
interstate wire communications. See 47 U.S.C. §§ 152(a), 153(a) (1976).
63. 47 U.S.C. § 307(b)(1976). The FCC also found applicable 47 U.S.C. § 303(h), which
gives the FCC authority "to issue rules establishing the area or zone to be served by any
station includ[ing] the power to prevent infringement of the rules by 'any person'. . . and
encompass[ing] authority to specify by rule'the conditions under which the station's signal
may be extended beyond the prescribed service area or zone by CATV." CATV, 2 F.C.C.2d
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lation developed at the agency level almost exclusively as a means
of protecting the FCC's broadcast regulatory scheme.
The Supreme Court in 1968 in United States v. Southwestern
Cable Co.64 upheld and adopted the FCC view of jurisdiction over
cable. Noting that "Congress 'formulated a unified and compre-
hensive regulatory system for the [broadcasting] industry' ",65 the
Court broadly read section 152(a) of the Communications Act as
independently confering on the FCC jurisdiction over cable televi-
sion as a form of wire communication. The Court also agreed that
the FCC had broad power to impose restrictions on the growth of
cable to achieve its objectives in the broadcast field. The Court
said, however, that this authority was limited to that "reasonably
ancillary to the effective performance of the Commission's various
responsibilities for the regulation of television broadcasting."6
The Supreme Court in 1972 in United States v. Midwest
Video Corp.,67 (Midwest Video 1) reaffirmed this "reasonably an-
cillary" interpretation of the FCC's independent cable jurisdiction.
Midwest Video I represents the greatest judicially approved exten-
sion of FCC jurisdiction over cable. A plurality of the Court upheld
the FCC's requirement that cable systems originate programming
as well as retransmit the broadcast programming of others. The
Court in Midwest Video I read Southwestern Cable as granting
the FCC "authority to regulate CATV with a view not merely to
protect but to promote the objectives for which the Commission
had been assigned jurisdiction over broadcasting."68
The Court in Midwest Video I found that the FCC's Title HI
objectives of program diversity and localism in regulating broad-
cast spectrum use justified placing program origination require-
ments on cable systems, even if no actual use by a particular cable
system of the broadcast spectrum existed. The Court reiterated
that FCC "ancillary jurisdiction" was founded on Title I, section
152(a) of the Act, but the Court stated that this section "does not
in and of itself prescribe any objectives for which the Commission's
regulatory power over [cable television] might properly be exer-
at 729.
64. 392 U.S. 157 (1968).
65. Id. at 168 (quoting FCC v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U.S. 134, 137 (1940)).
66. Id. at 178.
67. 406 U.S. 649 (1972); see also CATV, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and Notice of
Inquiry, 15 F.C.C.2d 417, 422 (1968).
68. Id. at 667. The Supreme Court in Southwestern Cable authorized the FCC to reg-
ulate cable activity when "reasonably ancillary to the effective performance of the Commis-
sion's various responsibilities." 392 U.S. at 178.
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cised," and thus that the FCC must find these objectives in an-
other section of the Act.6 9
Chief Justice Burger's concurring opinion in Midwest Video I
is significant for the present and future development of cable. The
Chief Justice noted that "CATV is dependent totally on broadcast
signals and is a significant link in the [communications] system as
a whole and therefore must be seen as within the jurisdiction of
the Act."' 70 Implicit in Chief Justice Burger's comment is the recog-
nition that if cable develops into a medium in which carriage of
broadcast signals plays a far less significant part, the analysis of
Midwest Video I no longer may provide a rationale for the FCC's
Title III jurisdiction over cable. Chief Justice Burger, while recog-
nizing that Midwest Video I granted the FCC "wide latitude" in
regulating cable communications, cautioned that "the Commis-
sion's position strains the outer limits of even the open-ended and
pervasive jurisdiction that has evolved by decisions of the Commis-
sion and the courts."'71
The FCC as a result of Midwest Video I interpreted broadly
its mandate to regulate cable to advance the Title III broadcasting
objectives of its enabling statute. The FCC has defined these
broadcasting objectives as primarily protecting existing broadcast-
ing interests.
IV. FCC ATTEMPTS TO REGULATE CABLE'S INTERACTIVE SERVICES
A. Early FCC Regulation of Two-Way Cable
A major policy debate in the early 1970's began over whether
the FCC should dictate and regulate cable services other than car-
riage of broadcast signals. Many people, even then, saw the poten-
tial for cable to become a much more varied carrier of broadband
two-way telecommunications services.72
The FCC in 1970 issued a proposed rulemaking to require
69. Id. at 661.
70. Id. at 675 (Burger, C.J., concurring)(emphasis added).
71. Id. at 676 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
72. The Alfred P. Sloan Foundation, realizing the powerful nature of the newly emerg-
ing cable communications, established the Sloan Commission on Cable Communications in
June 1970. The Foundation asked the Commission to "formulate a set of resolutions that
could aid the [FCC], Congress, or any other relevant decisionmaking body." Price, Requiem
for the Wired Nation: Cable Rulemaking at the FCC, 61 VA. L. REv. 541, 553 (1975). The
Sloan Commission in 1971 recommended that the FCC require future cable operators to
build systems with two-way capacity to supply a return signal capable of being handled by
computers located at the head end. ON THE CABLE, supra note 5, at 41.
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cable systems to build two-way capability into their facilities.7 3
The FCC in 1970 also announced a rule barring a telephone com-
pany from owning a cable system in the same service area.7 4 Sev-
eral telephone companies had become substantial holders of cable
franchises in the 1960's, these companies saw home video delivery
by cable as a natural extension of their wired local voice and data
loops. The FCC believed divestiture of these cross-owned systems
was necessary to protect the possibility for future competition be-
tween the two entities, particularly in the area of two-way
nonvideo broadband services. In what proved to be a prescient
statement, the FCC commented:
[T]here is a substantial expectation that broadband cables, in addition to
CATV services, will make economically and technically possible a wide vari-
ety of new and different services involving the distribution of data, informa-
tion storage and retrieval, and visual, facsimile and telemetry transmission of
all kinds. There is also a real potential that such services will be furnished
over regional and national networks consisting of local broadband cable sys-
tems interconnected by intercity microwave, coaxial cable and communica-
tions satellite systems.... [Tihere is, at present, ample basis for regarding
the provision of CATV service within a community as, at least, one important
gateway to entering the yet undeveloped market for these other widespec-
trum services. Thus, it is our purpose to insure against any arbitrary blockage
of this gateway.7 s
The FCC in 1972 adopted its general regulatory blueprint for
cable television development for the following decade.7 In a 1972
Report and Order the FCC viewed cable television as far more
than a medium that simply would retransmit existing broadcast
signals. To implement its broadened vision, the FCC required op-
erators to construct each new cable system with the capacity for
two-way communication and to provide channels for lease by other
persons. By 1977 all cable systems already built would have to re-
build to provide this interactive capacity. The FCC stated that
cable's two-way communication capacity could provide "surveys,
73. CATV, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 25 F.C.C.2d 38 (1970).
74. Section 214 Certificates, 21 F.C.C.2d 307, 325 (1970), modified in part, 22 F.C.C.2d
746 (1970), aff'd sub nom. General Tel. Co. of the Southwest v. United States, 449 F.2d 846
(5th Cir. 1971). The FCC stated that
it shall be our policy to bar all telephone common carriers from furnishing CATV ser-
vice to the viewing public in their operating territory except when ... [the common
carriers] make an appropriate showing in their applications that the proposed CATV
customer or customers is unrelated to or unaffiliated directly or indirectly with the
applicant.
Id. at 325.
75. Id. at 324-25.
76. Cable Television, Report & Order, 36 F.C.C.2d 143 (1972).
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marketing services, burglar alarm devices, and educational
feedback. ''7
The FCC's 1972 Report was the result of a compromise be-
tween various affected interests-cable operators, broadcasters,
and program copyright holders. The FCC saw cable's required pro-
vision of interactive services as one of the elements in this package
specifically designed to benefit the consuming public. The new
two-way services the FCC required cable to offer were part of a
complex set of tradeoffs, The FCC allowed cable to take distant
broadcast signals in return for providing-in addition to interac-
tive capability-a number of channels for free access by govern-
ment, educational institutions, and the public, and other channels
for leased access by commercial interests. The "leased access"
cable requirement was similar to the classic public utility require-
ments imposed on common carriers to provide capacity at uniform
rates to all potential users.
B. NARUC II
The FCC in 1974 faced the first challenge by telephone com-
panies to cable's provision of interactive services.78 Three parties79
opposed the FCC's attempt, included in the 1972 order to preempt
state regulation of the nonvideo two-way services the FCC required
new cable systems to provide. Although the FCC has sole authority
to regulate broadcasting, it shares with the states jurisdiction over
regulation of common carrier telecommunications services.8 The
telephone interests argued that nonvideo point-to-point services,
whether distributed by cable channels or telephone wires, were es-
sentially the same. If these services were purely intrastate, they
were subject to the sole jurisdiction-including potential rate and
entry regulation-of the states. The telephone parties further
stated that two-way cable television was not a naturally federal
77. Id. at 52.
78. Cable Television, Memorandum Opinion & Order, 49 F.C.C.2d 1078 (1974).
79. GTE Service Corporation, an independent trade association, and the state regula-
tory bodies through the National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners
(NARUC) challenged the FCC's preemption attempt. Id. at 1080-81.
80. See 47 U.S.C. § 152(b) (Supp. IV 1981).
[N]othing in this [chapter] shall be construed to apply or to give the Commission juris-
diction with respect to ... (2) any carrier engaged in interstate or foreign communica-
tion solely through physical connection with the facilities of another carrier not directly
or indirectly controlling or controlled by, or under direct or indirect common control
with such carrier.").
Id.
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concern and thus, that the FCC had no power to preempt state
jurisdiction over what were essentially telephone company
services.1
In answer to the telephone company claims, the FCC asserted
that: (1) cable was neither a common carrier nor a broadcaster, but
a "hybrid service" that deserved its own unique regulatory
scheme;8 2 (2) all cable services, whether video or nonvideo, were
"indivisible" and an "organic whole;"' '83 (3) section 1 of the Com-
munications Act gave the FCC a Congressional mandate to pro-
mote "rapid, efficient, nation-wide... wire and radio communica-
tions service" 84 for all citizens of the United States; (4) preemptive
federal authority over two-way services was necessary to insure de-
velopment of a "nationwide broadband communications grid by
cable";85 and, (5) allowing many different jurisdictions to impose
conflicting regulations would frustrate the FCC's national goal of
developing broadband services as a "synergistic mix of satellite,
microwave, broadcast and cable technology." 86
These arguments, however, failed to convince the Court of Ap-
peals for the District of Columbia Circuit. The court in National
Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners v. FCC (NARUC
11)87 reversed the FCC's assertion of plenary federal jurisdiction
over two-way cable. The court in NARUC II held that two-way
cable services, when they do not cross state lines, are not subject to
the jurisdiction of the FCC. The court, however, could not com-
mand a majority for a single decisional ground, but only for its
result. Only one judge found explicitly that these nonvideo two-
way cable services were in fact "common carrier" activities. 8
Judge Wilkey in NARUC II found that the FCC had over-
reached in its "holistic" view of cable operations and had violated
section 152(b) of the Communications Act, which bars the FCC
from regulating intrastate common carrier activities.89 Judge
Wilkey said that cable could be a broadcaster for some purposes
and a common carrier for others. He also rejected the FCC's goal
of a "nationwide broadband communications grid" as an indepen-
81. See 49 F.C.C.2d at 1081.
82. Id. at 1082.
83. Id. at 1082-83.
84. Id. at 1084.
85. Id. at 1082.
86. Id. at 1083-84.
87. 533 F.2d 601 (1976).
88. Id. at 609, 611.
89. See id. at 608, 611.
10631983]
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
dent ground for assuming total federal control over two-way ser-
vices.90 The FCC and the states had appeared to be able to resolve
cross-jurisdictional issues in other regulatory contexts, and Judge
Wilkey saw no reason why such issues could not be solved with
cable interactive services.9 1
Judge Wilkey seemed disturbed not only by the FCC's pre-
emption of all nonvideo two-way cable regulation but also by its
apparent intention to issue no federal cable rate and service regu-
lations. He thought that the absence of regulation created "the
possibility for [competitive] abuse by the unregulated cable sys-
tem."92 In an open invitation to the states to step in and regulate
cable services rates, Judge Wilkey said that "state regulatory agen-
cies, engaged for years in regulating the existing competition to the
proposed cable channels, are doubtless better fitted to fix those
rates-in our opinion they have the right reserved by statute to do
Judge Lumbard, while concurring in the finding that the FCC
was without power to preempt state regulation of cable nonvideo
two-way services, refused to reach the question of whether these
were "common carrier" services within the meaning of Title II of
the Communications Act.94 Judge Lumbard said that the FCC had
no authority to adopt any requirement for regulations concerning
nonvideo point-to-point services over cable at all, since this area
was not "ancillary to broadcasting," adopted by the Supreme
Court in Southwestern Cable as the only legitimate standard for
FCC cable regulation.9
Judge Wright vigorously dissented.9 6 He pointed out that since
interstate communications links by satellite or other carriers would
probably connect cable's local two-way services in the future, the
chance for any two-way cable services to be entirely intrastate in
character would be highly unlikely. Judge Wright thought the FCC
should have full power to regulate in an area of mixed intrastate
and interstate carriage. Thus, the decision in NARUC II left two-
90. See id. at 613.
91. See id. at 614.
92. Id. at 616.
93. Id. at 616-17.
94. Id. at 621 (Lumbard, J., concurring).
95. Id. at 622 (Lumbard, J., concurring). Judge Lumbard's opinion foreshadowed the
Supreme Court's decision three years later in FCC v. Midwest Video Corp., 440 U.S. 689
(1979) (Midwest Video 11), which struck down the FCC's 1972 cable access and two-way
capacity requirements by a similar rationale. See infra notes 97-101 and accompanying text.
96. NARUC II, 533 F.2d at 623-37 (Wright, J., dissenting).
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way cable services regulation with a highly ambiguous split in ju-
risdiction between the states and the federal government.
C. The Midwest Video II Case
The Supreme Court in FCC v. Midwest Video Corp. (Midwest
Video II)97 confused further the cable regulation issue by in effect
adopting the NARUC II dissent and finding that the FCC had im-
permissibly exceeded the limits of its ancillary jurisdiction over
cable system operators by requiring free and leased access channels
and two-way capacity. Section 3(h) of the Communications Act
provides that "a person engaged in broadcasting shall not be
deemed a common carrier."98 The Supreme Court read this section
of the Act and its decision in Southwestern Cable99 to mean that
the FCC can impose no Title H "common carrier" obligations on
cable that it could not impose on broadcasters. The Court in Mid-
west Video II found that since the FCC order required cable oper-
ators to "hold out facilities indifferently for public use" by provid-
ing access channels, the FCC was in effect impermissibly treating
the operators as classic common carriers. 100
The focus of the Court in Midwest Video II, however, was on
the Commission's free and leased access rules. The Court included
almost no discussion in its decision of the relationship of the FCC's
two-way capacity requirement to these access rules. In fact, the
Court left the door open slightly for the FCC to revisit the two-way
rules and separately justify them.101
97. 440 U.S. 689 (1979). The FCC in 1976 promulgated regulations that required cable
operators with 3500 or more subscribers to develop a minimum 20 channel capacity by 1986
and to make available certain channels for free and leased access. These rules prohibited
cable operators from selecting the parties to utilize the access channels or the material to be
transmitted. The rules also required cable systems to develop two-way capacity by 1986.
Petitioner Midwest Video challenged these regulations on the ground that the FCC had
exceeded its jurisdiction in adopting them. Id. at 691-94.
98. 47 U.S.C. 153(h)(1976).
99. 392 U.S. 157 (1968)(FCC authority "is restricted to that reasonably ancillary to the
effective performance of the Commission's various responsibilities for the regulation of tele-
vision broadcasting.").
100. Midwest Video II, 440 U.S. at 706, n.16.
101. Although the Court in a footnote expressed a reluctance to accept the premise
that the FCC would have promulgated one rule on grounds independent of the other rules,
it refused to foreclose the possibility of revitalizing one or more of the stricken rules in
another context. See id. at 708 n.18.
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D. The Current State of the Law Governing Cable Nonvideo
Two-Way Services
Previous cases and recent FCC history make clear only a few
points. The FCC under Midwest Video H cannot force cable oper-
ators to provide their own two-way services or to offer two-way ca-
pacity for lease by others. To reimpose this requirement the FCC
would have to follow the suggestion of the Court and readopt the
rules with a justification different from that it articulated in Mid-
west Video II.
Even so, the FCC is unlikely to attempt reinstitution of its
former requirement that cable provide two-way capacity without a
Congressional mandate. Competitive market forces and local de-
mand for interactive services in new cable franchise agreements
appear to be doing a far better job of stimulating development of
two-way services than did the former FCC rules.02 Competition
among cable operators for local franchises is bringing two-way
technology on stream at least as fast, and probably faster, than
federal requirements could have done. Ordering companies to pro-
vide services that consumers appear to be getting without federal
regulatory intervention is inconsistent with the current deregu-
latory philosophy of the FCC.
Midwest Video II, however, does not explicitly address the
role the FCC can play when cable systems do begin to voluntarily
offer nonvideo two-way services on an interstate basis. Midwest
Video H leaves as an open question the FCC's authority to regu-
late these services, particularly if the services are interconnected
on a regional or national basis. If cable operators voluntarily begin
to "hold out facilities indifferently for public use," and become sig-
nificant competitors for interstate data and/or voice transmission,
cable's competitors again may make the argument that the FCC
should regulate cable systems as Title IH common carriers in the
provision of these services.
102. This is also true of free public, governmental, and editorial access channels. FCC
rules established the maximum and the minimum number of access channels a municipality
could demand when granting a cable franchise. Now, in the absence of the rules, franchise
agreements often specify a greater number of access channels than the old FCC standards
required.
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E. Current Proposals to Reimpose FCC Common Carrier
Requirements on Cable Interactive Services
Parties interested in the regulation of two-way cable services
have filed with the FCC two separate pleadings that seek to re-
establish federal regulations imposing on cable requirements simi-
lar to common carrier duties. The first, a petition for rulemaking
filed by Henry Geller,103 seeks to reimpose on high capacity cable
systems a leased access channel scheme similar to that struck down
by Midwest Video 11.104 Under the Geller scheme, the FCC would
require cable systems with more than thirty channels to offer a
fixed percentage of their channels for leased access.1 5
The Geller petition does not propose full common carrier rate
regulation of these leased channels. The proposal suggests instead
that if competitive abuses develop, the FCC should require use of a
fully separated subsidiary for a cable system's own programming or
other services, auction of leased channels, or arbitration. The FCC
would use rate regulation only as a last resort.110
The second effort before the FCC is a petition by two security
company trade associations10 7 for a rulemaking proceeding that
would require owners of large two-way cable systems to make com-
mercial public safety channels available.108 The petitioners, in urg-
ing the imposition of security alarm company access requirements
on large cable systems argue that the FCC should require "all new
urban" cable systems to provide security alarm systems. Since the
petitioners admit that under Midwest Video II the FCC currently
may not have jurisdiction to require two-way security alarm sys-
tems, they argue that the FCC should propose legislation to give it
103. Geller is a former FCC General Counsel and former Director of the National
Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA). The Geller petition has been
pending at the FCC since October, 1981.
104. Petition of Henry Geller, In re Cable Leased Channel Access, F.C.C. R.M. 3999
(Oct. 9, 1981) [hereinafter cited as Petition of Henry Geller] (available in Vanderbilt Law
Review office). The Geller proposal is based on cable's alleged position as an essential ser-
vice, the ability of cable operators to use this essential facility as a bottleneck to prevent
competitors from reaching cable-delivered markets, and the first amendment implications of
control of a large amount of programming resting in a single entity. Id. at 6-9.
105. Id. at 50-51.
106. Id. at 52-53.
107. The National Burglar & Fire Alarm Association and the Central Station Electri-
cal Protection Association are the petitioners.
108. Petition of National Burglar & Fire Alarm Assoc. & Central Station Electrical
Protection Assoc., In re Public Commercial Access to Broadband Cable TV Distribution
Systems for Public Safety Purposes, F.C.C. R.M. 4164 (July 9, 1982) (available in Vander-
bilt Law Review office).
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the needed authority. Finally, petitioners argue that, in order to
avoid potential competitive difficulties, the FCC should not permit
cable systems subject to this requirement to provide or install
monitoring equipment or alarm services. In the alternative, the
cable company could provide alarm services through a separate
corporate subsidiary dealing at arm's length with the cable system
operator.10 9
V. STATE AND LOCAL EFFORTS To REGULATE CABLE'S Two-WAY
SERVICES
A cable company that offers an intrastate two-way telecommu-
nications service must as a result of NARUC II convince regula-
tory authorities in the particular state that it is not a common car-
rier under state law. Cable operators will argue that state public
utility commissions (PUCs) should not subject cable to the same
degree of regulation as telephone companies even if the cable ser-
vice technically meets the state common carrier definition. Cable
systems that fail in this effort may be subject to extensive state
schemes of rate and entry regulation. State regulatory commissions
may require cable systems to file their two-way service offerings
and proposed rates in advance of offering. State regulators may re-
quire uniform rates and conditions of cable-offered telecommuni-
cations services for all ultimate customers. States also may demand
that cable operators provide to competitors offering the same ser-
vice nondiscriminatory access to the cable system's channel capac-
ity.110 In states that have not taken an active role in cable regula-
tion, local city franchising authorities still may impose their own
layer of "leased access" or similar conditions on cable interactive
services."'
Interactive data transmission and security alarm services of-
109. Id. at 15-16. The impetus for the petition for leased access to cable appears to be
the security alarm industry's failure to obtain similar access to telephone company facilities.
Twenty-nine alarm companies, shortly after filing this petition, filed an antitrust suit
against AT&T in the Washington, D.C. federal district court claiming that AT&T has en-
gaged in a conspiracy to monopolize the security alarm business. The alarm companies
claimed that the telephone company employed various tactics designed to force alarm com-
panies to use only AT&T equipment and services and that AT&T used information ob-
tained by this process to develop competitive alarm system services. Among other forms of
relief, the plaintiffs seek an injunction barring AT&T or any former AT&T company from
furnishing remote alarm system services. See AAA Alarm Co., Inc. v. American Tel. & Tel.
Co. No. 82-2907 (D.D.C. fied Oct. 12, 1982) (available in Vanderbilt Law Review office).
110. See, e.g., Blizzard of Bills, CABLEVISION, Jan. 17, 1983, at 65.
111. See infra note 133 and accompanying text.
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fered by local cable systems have stimulated state regulatory bod-
ies in New York, New Jersey, Connecticut and Nebraska to begin
active proceedings to determine the state's proper role in the deliv-
ery of these services. All these states still are engaged in these de-
liberations. While several state PUCs with cable jurisdiction have
not moved to tariff two-way cable services, bills or regulatory pro-
ceedings that would place cable within state PUC jurisdiction are
pending in other states, such as West Virginia, Florida, Oregon,
California, and New Mexico.112
A. Pending State Regulatory Proceedings Involving Two-Way
Cable Services
1. New York
Manhattan Cable Television, Inc. first tested the use of cable
for data transmission between business users in 1974.113 In Octo-
ber, 1976, the New York State Public Service Commission (PSC)
served Manhattan Cable with an order to show cause why the PSC
should not require the company to apply for a "Certificate of Pub-
lic Convenience and Necessity."11'
112. See Blizzard of Bills, supra note 110, at 65. The Oregon Public Service Commis-
sion in 1983 began considering whether to regulate cable data transmission as a "utility
service." The PSC hearings arose in part at the request of Pacific Northwest Bell Telephone
Co. (PNB), which had sought to block Cablesystems Pacific's offering by refusing to allow
the cable operator to use PNB pole and conduit space. Cablesystems Pacific filed an anti-
trust suit against PNB, see Complaint, Cablesystems Pacific v. Pacific Northwest Bell Tel.
Co., No. A8305-03156 (Ore. Cir. Ct. April -, 1983), and petitioned the Justice Department
for an interpretation barring PNB from the data market. See Communications Daily, Sept.
7, 1983.
The California Public Utilities Commission also has instituted hearings to determine
the effects of competition on local and long distance telecommunications services, including
cable's competitive impact. See Order Instituting Investigation, No. 011-83-06-01 (Cal. PUC
June 29, 1983); Order Instituting Investigation, No. O-83-02-01 (Cal. PUC Feb. 24, 1983).
In New Mexico, Mountain Bell filed a request with the State Corporation Commission alleg-
ing that Albuquerque Cable TV's offering of a data transmission system was provision of
telephone services without proper certification. See ALBUQUERQUE CABLE SYSTEM EXPERI-
MENTS WITH DATA TRANSMISSION; MOUNTAIN BELL OmJEcTs, 2 Data Cable News, July 1983, at
4-5. The State Corporation Commission voted to stay the complaint and allow the cable
system's experiment to continue. See Communications Daily, Sept. 9, 1983, at 4.
113. Manhattan Cable filed as an intervenor in NARUC II because of its concern with
the potential of state entry, service, and tariff regulation in the two-way service field. See
NARUC H, 533 F.2d at 601.
114. See Comments of Robert Abrams, Attorney General of the State of New York,
Proceedings on Motion of the Commission as to Private Line Service Provided by MAN-
HATTAN CABLE TV, New York Public Service Commission Case 27091, at 1 (Jan. 7,
1983) [hereinafter cited as Comments of Robert Abrams] (available in Vanderbilt Law Re-
view office).
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Although the issue lay dormant for several years, the New
York PSC recently has revived the controversy.11 On November
26, 1982, the New York PSC issued a new notice to obtain com-
ments on the show cause order.1"' New York Telephone Co. argued
that Manhattan Cable's two-way point-to-point broadband data
transmission services, as well as other services that were offered or
contemplated by the cable company, were indistinguishable from
those offered by New York Telephone. Thus, New York Telephone
argued, the regulatory treatment of the two entities should be the
same because unregulated operation of cable company data ser-
vices would lead to "uneconomic bypass" of the local regulated
telephone company. 1 7
The New York Attorney General also filed comments, propos-
ing a different approach to the issue. The Attorney General felt
that the fundamental question was not PSC jurisdiction over the
particular data services offered by Manhattan Cable, but the over-
all nature of state regulation of cable's nonbroadcast channel offer-
ings. 1 " New York has a State Commission on Cable, with a sepa-
rate statutory mandate to oversee the operations of cable systems
in the state.11 9 The Attorney General argued that the PSC had to
address in a broadened inquiry the potentially overlapping juris-
diction over two-way services between the two commissions.120
2. New Jersey
A proceeding similar to that proposed by the New York Attor-
ney General already is underway in New Jersey. The New Jersey
Office of Cable Television exists as part of the overall State Board
115. The revival of interest in the original show cause order possibly was in response
to a series of newspaper and magazine articles that indicated Manhattan Cable's two-way
service operations generated over $1 million in annual revenue. E.g., Common Carrier Look-
Alike? , CABLEVISION, Feb. 7, 1983, at 60. Manhattan Cable presently has one multi-user data
trunk serving fourteen customers at forty locations, a 160-circuit data trunk serving Chase
Manhattan Bank, and eight other dedicated lines. Affadiavit of Mr. Carl Gambello, Director
of Data Services, Manhattan Cable Television, Inc., Jan. 7, 1983, at 2-5 (available in Van-
derbilt Law Review office).
116. See Comments of Robert Abrams, supra note 114.
117. Comments of New York Telephone Co., Proceedings on Motion of the Commis-
sion as to Private Line Service Provided by Manhattan Cable TV, New York Public Service
Commission Case 27091, at 4 (Jan. 7, 1982) [hereinafter cited as Comments of New York
Telephone] (available in Vanderbilt Law Review office). "Uneconomic bypass occurs when
an entity deflects traffic from the network of the regulated carrier, not as a result of eco-
nomic efficiency but as a result of artificial differences between rates and costs." Id.
118. Comments of Robert Abrams, supra note 114, at 3-4.
119. See N.Y. ExEc. LAW §§ 814-816 (McKinney 1982).
120. Comments of Robert Abrams, supra note 114, at 2.
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of Public Utilities, rather than as a separate entity as in New
York.1"1 In 1980, when Cablevision of Bayonne proposed to offer a
two-way security and alarm system, New Jersey Bell argued that
cable should offer these services only under the full panoply of
state tariffing and other public utility regulation appropriate to
common carriers.12 2
The Office of Cable Television decided two years later that in-
stead of continuing to focus on the specific cable security service
offering challenged by New Jersey Bell, it would launch a "generic
inquiry" into the jurisdictional, economic, and regulatory questions
surrounding provision of cable two-way services. 23 The affected
cable companies and the National Cable Television Association
have filed comments taking sharp issue with New Jersey Bell's ar-
gument that cable companies have a "monopoly" position in secur-
ity services and other two-way offerings that calls for public utility
regulation of cable rates and services. 24
3. Connecticut
The Connecticut legislature gave the Connecticut PUC the
power to regulate the rates of all cable systems in that state in the
mid-1960's 12 5 While the agency decided that traditional utility
rate regulation was inappropriate during the early years of cable
development, the PUC has been unable to treat cable as having an
identity totally separate from conventional utilities.
The Connecticut PUC currently has before it a petition filed
by the Connecticut Security Dealers Association (CSDA) that ar-
gues that the PUC has jurisdiction over security services offered by
cable systems. 126 Since the Connecticut PUC requires cable compa-
121. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 48:5A-4 (West Supp. 1983-84).
122. Brief of New Jersey Bell Telephone Co., In re the Office of Cable Television's
Investigation, New Jersey Board of Public Utilities, No. 798C-6527, at 24 (Mar. 24, 1980)
(available in Vanderbilt Law Review office).
123. See Reply Comments of Cablevision of Bayonne, In re the Office of Cable Televi-
sion's Investigation, New Jersey Board of Public Utilities, No. 8111C-6837, at 1 (July 23,
1982) [hereinafter cited as Reply Comments of Cablevision of Bayonne] (available in Van-
derbilt Law Review office).
124. See id. at 6-10. The cable companies argued that cable television possesses a sep-
arate character and identity from telephone common carrier-public utilities; that cable sys-
tems lack market power or a monopoly base from which to cross-subsidize their services;
and that substitutes for cable systems are too numerous and significant to generate the same
concerns that telephone utilities present. Id.
125. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 16-333d (West Supp. 1983-84).
126. Brief of Security Dealers Assoc., Application of Cablevision of Conn. for Approval
of Initial Rates and Charges, Conn. Dept. of Public Utility Control No. 811115 (Apr. 12,
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nies to comply with franchise promises and commitments, which
include providing security alarm services, CSDA argues that the
PUC should set cable system rates for security alarm services.
CSDA also has argued that the PUC is obligated to consider the
antitrust implications of the proposed security alarm service.127
4. Nebraska
The Nebraska Public Service Commission (PSC) began hear-
ings in early 1983 to determine whether it should subject certain
two-way services offered by Cox Communications, holder of the
Omaha cable franchise, to common carrier regulation.12 The Ne-
braska PSC examined its jurisdiction over two services offered by
Cox: (1) CommLine, an institutional cable network carrying data
and other business communications services, and (2) INDAX, a
home interactive service that includes home banking and shopping,
as well as pay per view entertainment events.
The Nebraska PSC in April, 1983 found that both CommLine
and INDAX offered "telephone service in the territory of another
telephone company," and issued an order requiring the Cox com-
panies to obtain a certificate of public convenience and necessity
1982) [hereinafter cited as Cablevision Docket] (available in Vanderbilt Law Review office).
127. See id. at 5-6. In June 1983 Southern New England Tel. Co. (SNET) intervened,
asking the DPUC to declare that SNET is not required to provide pole and duct space to
Cable operators that offer two-way nonvideo services such as security alarm systems. Com-
ments of SNET, Cablevision Docket (June 20, 1983). SNET also has opposed Cablevision of
Connecticut's proposal to offer two-way business data and voice services. Comments of
SNET, Cablevision Docket (Sept. 16, 1983).
128. See In re Investigation into Proposed Operations of Cox Cable, MCI, and Corn-
rnline, Order to Cease & Desist, Neb. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, (Apr. 19, 1983) (available in Van-
derbilt Law Review office). The PSC investigation began at the instigation of Northwestern
Bell, which argued that Cox planned to cream-skim large Omaha business users of high
speed data. See Northwestern Bell Says Commline Plan Poses Threat, Omaha World-Her-
ald, Mar. 8, 1983. Northwestern Bell also has filed joint pleadings with the Mountain States
and Pacific Northwest telephone companies asking the FCC to defer action on Cox Cable's
pending applications for digital termination facilities for Omaha, Tuscon, and Vancouver.
See Letter to Gary Epstein, Chief, Common Carrier Bureau FCC (Feb. 25, 1983) (available
in Vanderbilt Law Review office); Informal Objection to Grant, In re Applications of Cox
Cable Communications, FCC File Nos. 10322/10324-CDM-P-82 (Mar. 11, 1983) [hereinafter
cited as Objection to Cox Grant] (available in Vanderbilt Law Review office). The telephone
companies argued that Cox proposes to use the Digital Terminations Systems (DTS) to
interconnect with its cable systems, thus providing both long distance and local telecommu-
nications services. The FCC has preempted state regulation of DTS, see Digital Termina-
tion Systems, 86 F.C.C.2d 360 (1981), recons., 90 F.C.C.2d 319 (1982) appeal pending sub
nom. National Ass'n of Reg. Util. Comm'rs v. FCC, No. 81-1556 (D.C. Cir. 1981), thus, the
telephone companies fear that Cox will escape state jurisdiction by connecting interstate
DTS facilities with its intrastate cable data transmission links.
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before offering their services. 129 Cox immediately sought a ruling
from the FCC declaring that the CommLine data services were
federally preempted""0 and filed in federal district court for a stay
of the Nebraska PSC's order.' 3 ' The district court granted Cox a
preliminary injunction, allowing CommLine to continue its ser-
vices, but required Cox to seek a certificate of public convenience
and necessity from the Nebraska PSC.
3 2
B. Local Franchising Authorities: The Third Regulatory Tier
The local municipal franchising authority is a wild card in the
state and local regulatory structure. With the removal of most FCC
restrictions on local cable franchising, including the federal access
rules that formerly operated as maximum limits on local demands,
cities are far more aggressive in bargaining with cable systems for
significant free and leased channel capacity. Some cities actually
may prohibit cable systems from offering interactive services in
competition with the local telephone company or other vendors."'3
Cities may specify in their requests for proposals or final
franchise agreements that cable systems must offer data or voice
communications services to businesses, nonprofit institutions, or
homes on a nondiscriminatory basis subject to published rates. A
cable company may voluntarily offer a similar proposal as part of
its franchise application. The cable system that uses terms of art
such as "nondiscriminatory rates" or "rate of return" in an appli-
cation might find that the local franchising authority interprets
those terms as intent on the part of the cable franchise applicant
to operate part of its proposed system in a common carrier mode.
129. Id. at 2-3.
130. See In re Cox Cable Communications, Inc., Petition for Declaratory Ruling,
F.C.C. File No. COB DFD 83-1 (July 1, 1983).
131. See Cox Cable Communications, Inc. v. Simpson, No. 83-L-240, slip op. (D. Neb.
Aug. 2, 1983)(mem.).
132. See id., slip op. at 27-28. The court used the abstention doctrine to avoid decid-
ing the constitutional questions raised by the case. See id. at 5-14. Nevertheless, the court
indicated strong sympathy with Cox's arguments that Commmline services were "private
carriage" and were federally-preempted because of their mixed interstate-intrastate charac-
ter. Id. at 11, 19-27. The court also expressed concern with the "troubling element of selec-
tivity" in the Nebraska PSC's decision to investigate Cox at the suggestion of Northwestern
Bell, noting that the Nebraska Supreme Court had declared that "the regulatory mission of
the [Nebraska] PSC is to serve the public interest, not to establish a monopoly for public
utilities." Id. at 11-12.
133. Louisville, Ky. and Indianapolis, Ind. both bar cable companies from competing
in the home security business. See Common Carrier Look-Alike?, CABLEvISION, Feb. 7, 1983,
at 60-62.
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If a local municipality requires a cable system to offer program-
mers or other service vendors nondiscriminatory access to channels
at uniform charges, the cable system will have difficulty convincing
the state or local public utility commission that the cable system is
not operating as a common carrier subject to the commission's ju-
risdiction. Thus, despite cable's best intentions to avoid the com-
mon carrier label, without protective legislation or preemption,
practical constraints such as pressure from municipal officials may
force a cable system into de facto operation as a common carrier.
VI. ARGUMENTS AGAINST IMPOSING PUBLIC UTILITY
REQUIREMENTS ON CABLE INTERACTIVE SERVICES
Proceedings that argue for leased access, tariffed rates, and
other indicia of common carrier status will continue to proliferate
at both the state and federal level as two-way cable services grow.
Cable's opponents will seek state regulation because the states
have been much more sympathetic in the past to the arguments of
telephone companies against letting unregulated competitors enter
fields occupied by the telephone companies. Among the traditional
telephone company arguments are claims that: (1) cable systems
will cross-subsidize their data and information retrieval services
with monopoly profits extracted from subscribers to their video
services, particularly in the future when most homes will be ob-
taining their television programming from cable;13 4 (2) cable, if al-
lowed to become a real competitor to the telephone company's lo-
cal loop, will cream-skim lucrative electronic funds transfer and
other business data traffic, leaving the phone companies with the
less profitable basic home ratepayer services; 3 5 (3) building two
basic local broadband loops, a "natural monopoly" service, will
lead to "destructive competition" and a waste of economic re-
sources;136 (4) cable is a "monopoly" broadband pathway to the
home and business customer, and could use its position as an es-
sential bottleneck facility to exclude other purveyors of similar ser-
vices-alarm systems, electronic banking and shopping, or data
transmission-from the marketplace.3 7
Cable companies, in response, argue that the telephone com-
panies not only have an overly simplistic view of cable's existing or
134. See Reply Comments of Cablevision of Bayonne, supra note 123, at 6-10; Objec-
tion to Cox Grant, supra note 128, at 29.
135. See, e.g., supra note 128.
136. See Comments of New York Telephone, supra note 117, at 4.
137. See Petition of Henry Geller, supra note 104, at 6-9.
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potential market position, but also that they fail to recognize the
unique character of cable as a communications medium.
A. Cable As An Editorial Medium: The Telepublisher
Argument
Cable providers increasingly are arguing for the full first
amendment protections of a print editor or publisher.13 Cable
companies traditionally have not been passsive offerors of indis-
criminate channel capacity to the public for hire, but active edito-
rial agents selecting the material carried over their facilities. Cable,
unlike broadcasting, offers a multitude of specialized channels and
thus is like a publisher of a magazine or newspaper, which carries
everything from news to features to personal want ads without be-
ing subject to requirements of nondiscriminatory access or other
indicia of utility regulation. 9
Constitutional protections restrict closely governmental bodies
in their ability to impinge upon a cable operator's editorial deci-
sions about how to best use the channel capacity cable technology
affords. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals in Midwest Video II
originally struck down the FCC's mandatory cable access rules in
part because governmentally mandated access to cable was con-
trary to the cable operator's first amendment rights.1 40 The court
in Midwest Video II criticized the FCC's access rules for failing to
consider the cable system's editorial discretion."
While the Supreme Court affirmed Midwest Video II, it rested
its decision on statutory grounds and chose not to reach the consti-
tutional issues presented. The Court, however, expressly stated
that the cable operators' first amendment grounds for attacking
the FCC's rules were "not frivolous." 14 2 In addition, the D.C. Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals in Home Box Office v. FCC14 s found that
138. See, e.g., National Cable Television Assoc., The First Amendment, A New Inter-
pretation Needed for Cable, CABLEVISION, May 18, 1981, at 114.
139. See Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974)(Florida statute
requiring newspapers to print replies to editorial criticisms of candidates for political office
violated first amendment); Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm.,
412 U.S. 94 (1973)(broadcasters not required to accept paid editorial advertisements).
140. 571 F.2d 1025 (8th Cir. 1978), aff'd on other grounds, 440 U.S. 689 (1979).
141. See 571 F.2d at 1053-54. The court stated that "[iln wresting from cable opera-
tors the control of privately owned facilities," the access rules impermissibly risked "an en-
largement of Government control over the content of [cablecast] discussion of public is-
sues." Id. (emphasis added).
142. See Midwest Video II, 440 U.S. at 709, n.19.
143. 567 F.2d 9, 49-50 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 829 (1977).
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federal interference with a cable operator's editorial function in
controlling the use of cable channel capacity for pay movies and
sports contravened first amendment interests.
Cable systems claim that the decision to carry a security ser-
vice or informational or entertainment programming on a particu-
lar cable channel is as much an exercise of a cable operator's edito-
rial function as is a newspaper editor's decision to run a news story
on home security protection in a particular column of his paper.
This separate and unique first amendment character of cable as an
editorial medium is retained regardless of whether a cable system
provides ancillary services that are similar to services provided by
or over the lines of traditional telephone utilities. Two-way ser-
vices presently constitute a sufficiently small part of overall cable
system operations and revenues, which are derived primarily from
editorial functions, that state or federal regulation of cable as if it
were truly in the common carrier-public utility business would be
unreasonable. 14'
B. Failure to Meet Classic Tests For Utility Regulation
Cable companies also argue that cable interactive services do
not meet the classic tests for state common carrier regulation. His-
torically the government has reserved utility regulation for "quasi-
public" services "affected with a public interest, '14 5 which provide
a function, such as water, power, and basic voice telephone service,
that is essential to society. While home security services and data
transfer between businesses are important, cable's provision of se-
curity systems and data transmission links is not essential to soci-
ety as the few such systems that currently exist and the many
other providers of the same services evidence. The existing domi-
nant position of the telephone company in most two-way informa-
tion carriage markets demonstrates that competing two-way cable
services are not truly essential.
Cable systems note that two-way services do not meet other
elements of the classic common carrier definition enunciated in
NARUC L Cable systems normally do not hold themselves out to
provide two-way services to all persons indifferently.1 4 Rather,
144. One party commenting in the New Jersey inquiry stated that "[c]able's provision
of security services no more put it in the common carrier business than a telephone com-
pany's provision of Dial-A-Joke puts that utility in the entertainment business." Reply
Comments of Cablevision of Bayonne, supra note 123, at 2.
145. See, e.g., NARUC I, 525 F.2d at 640 n.54.
146. See NARUC I, 525 F.2d at 641.
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where two-way services exist, cable systems "make individualized
decisions, in particular cases, whether and on what terms to
deal, ' 147 tailoring services to particular business or home customer
needs. Cable companies in many cases offer these services on a
joint venture, shared revenue basis with other service vendors,
such as newspaper or alarm companies. 14
Cable systems since Midwest Video II have offered their two-
way services-whether self-generated or leased-without legal or
judicial compulsion to serve all customers indiscriminately. The
FCC currently does not require cable systems to provide particular
two-way services to customers who do not meet cable's require-
ments. The business practice of the cable industry, which the
NARUC I court held was a controlling consideration,149 thus is to
offer services in a manner inconsistent with common carriage.
Cable ancillary two-way services may be functionally similar
to those that telephone companies or other independent suppliers
offer. The NARUC I court, however, did not require the same reg-
ulatory treatment of all services that telephone companies hap-
pened to offer.150 Telephone companies offer transmission facilities
for entertainment programming and computer access but are not
entertainment or computer companies. Similarly business practice,
rather than services, is determinative of cable's common carrier
status.
C. Cable As a "Nondominant" Medium
In response to state and federal efforts to bring cable services
under a public utility regulation scheme, cable companies contrast
the historical monopoly of the telephone company in switched lo-
cal exchange services with the highly competitive cable market-
place.1 51 State and federal agencies have regulated telephone com-
panies because the telephone companies' position as monopoly
suppliers of an essential service has given them the ability and the
incentive to charge excessive rates and to provide service on dis-
147. Id.
148. See N.Y. Times, Jan. 7, 1981, § 4, at 4 (plan between Warner Amex, its subsidi-
ary, Atari, and Compuserve Computer to provide a cable TV retrieval system allowing for
news, shopping, and entertainment services).
149. See NARUC I, 525 F.2d at 642-44.
150. See id. at 641.
151. See N.Y. Times, Sept. 24, 1980, § 2 at 1 (seventeen companies bidding for
franchise rights to the boroughs of New York City); N.Y. Times, July 27, 1980, at I (describ-
ing the intense competition for the right to provide cable service in Cincinnati).
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criminatory terms. The economic characteristics of the local tele-
phone services market today are substantially unchanged from
when this public utility regulatory system was created, thus local
phone companies still retain the ability either to charge excessive
rates or to cross-subsidize their security, data, or other nonvoice
services from their monopoly switched local exchange service
base.152Telephone companies still can eliminate competition by
charging uncompetitively low rates.
Cable systems do not have the ability to cross-subsidize their
new two-way services from a monopoly base. Cable's non-two-way
services exist in a highly competitive marketplace in which many
other industries provide entertainment and information services to
the home. Current cable video programming services have many
substitutes, such as commercial, public, and subscription broadcast
television, satellite master antenna television systems (SMATV),
multi-point microwave carriers (MDS), video cassette recorders
and video discs. In addition, the FCC recently has authorized new
competitive services such as direct satellite to home broadcasting
(DBS), 15s low power television stations (LPTV), T' and multi-chan-
nel MDS.1"5
Thus cable has to compete not only with the telephone com-
pany for two-way data, security, and similar services, but also with
many alternative networks being established by independent tele-
communications providers. Many other noncable competitors stim-
ulated by recent pro-competitive FCC policies favoring multiple
entry in telecommunications fields are proposing new means of
152. See, e.g., Student Symposium, 69 CALIF. L. REV. 443, 486 (1981).
Regulators have long been concerned about the effect of permitting a large regulated
firm such as AT&T to enter adjacent unregulated markets. For its operations in regu-
lated markets, Bell simply calculates its costs and capital investment and submits tar-
iffs sufficient to cover those costs and provide a reasonable rate of return on its invest-
ment. Thus, by allocating disproportionate shares of costs and investment to its
regulated operations, Bell effectively could subsidize its competitive operations. The
result is that monopoly customers would overpay for services, and other firms operat-
ing in unregulated markets would find it difficult or impossible to compete with
Bell....
Cross-subsidization can also take other forms, including transfers of personnel and
information from monopoly to competitive services and preferential treatment of a cor-
porate affiliate over its competitors.
Id.
153. See Direct Broadcast Satellites, Report & Order, 90 F.C.C.2d 676 (1982).
154. See 48 Fed. Reg. 21,478 (1983) (to be codified at 47 C.F.R. §§ 73, 74); 47 Fed.
Reg. 30,495, 31,555 (1982).
155. See Report & Order & Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, No. 80-112, CC
Docket No. 80-116, 48 Fed. Reg. 33,873 (1983).
1078 [Vol. 36:1045
TWO-WAY CABLE
competing with local telephone company loops for data, and per-
haps even voice, service. Several applicants, for example, have
sought FCC authority to construct a "digital termination service"
(DTS) that would use microwave radio to carry intraurban data
traffic. 156 Competitors also can use other radio spectrum frequen-
cies, and even portions of broadcast television signals, for many of
these data services.
Historically, regulatory agencies and the federal courts have
imposed under antitrust theory open entry and access regulation
only on truly unique and essential "bottleneck facilities.1157 The
FCC has taken a similar approach and recently begun to classify
telecommunications carriers as "dominant" or "nondominant,"
substantially reducing or eliminating traditional restrictions on
services offered by the nondominant carriers. 158 Thus, even if a
cable system's provision of two-way services met all the tests for a
common carrier, such as holding out its services under published
rates to all customers, the question would remain whether cable as
a nondominant carrier should be subject to full public utility
regulation.
The FCC's Office of Plans and Policy (OPP), after an exhaus-
tive analysis of the environment in which cable presently operates,
concluded in 1981 that cable systems lack the economic and legal
attributes of a natural monopoly because all major markets and
submarkets in which cable competes-including two-way nonvideo
broadband services-are workably competitive, with a number of
alternative suppliers. 59 Common carrier regulation of cable is in-
appropriate particularly, for example, in the areas of provision of
156. See Digital Termination Systems, 86 F.C.C.2d 360 (1981), recons., 90 F.C.C.2d
319 (1982), appeal pending sub nom. National Ass'n of Reg. Util. Comm'rs v. FCC, No. 81-
1556 (D.C. Cir. 1981); see also Bell Facing Fresh Challenges, N.Y. Times, Aug. 28, 1981, § 4,
at 1.
157. See, e.g., Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366 (1973) (distribution
of electricity); Silver v. New York Stock Exchange, 373 U.S. 341 (1963)(provision of private
wire connections); Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1955)(provision of AP news
to nonmembers and allowing members to block membership applications); United States v.
Terminal R.R. Assoc., 224 U.S. 383 (1912)(unification of railroad terminal facilities).
158. See Competitive Carrier Rulemaking, First Report & Order, 85 F.C.C.2d 1, 6
(1981)(defining carrier as "dominant" if it has "substantial opportunity and incentive to
subsidize the rates for its more competitive services with revenues obtained from its monop-
oly or near-monopoly services" and as "non-dominant" if it does not possess "the market
power necessary to sustain prices either unreasonably above or below costs", Id.; Competi-
tive Carrier Rulemaking, Second Report & Order, 91 F.C.C.2d 59, 65 (1982) (nondominant
resale carriers would be free of 47 U.S.C. § 214 entry and exit requirements)).
159. See FCC Policy on Cable Ownership 124-25, F.C.C. Staff Report 107 (Nov.
1981)(available in Vanderbilt Law Review office).
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alarm services or business data. Cable systems hold only a small
position within the growing private security market, and compete
directly with the telephone companies, radio service operators, and
many other alternative networks. Likewise, cable holds a tiny share
of the business data communications market, which includes tele-
phone companies and other private networks.
D. Premature Regulation as an Impediment to Development of
Cable Interactive Services
Cable company provision of interactive services has not yet
developed a national pattern of business arrangement. Cable sys-
tems normally make different decisions in particular communities
whether and how to offer two-way services-through a lease, joint
venture, or through their own business capacity.160 For the FCC,
state PUC, or local franchising authority actions to fix these ar-
rangements into a single public utility mold would be premature.
The FCC recently has acknowledged a preference for competi-
tion over regulation in many areas, especially in cable services,
where extensive regulation halted cable's early growth without pro-
viding discernible commensurate benefits to the public interest.161
Many regulatory schemes the FCC proposed in the past for cable
were premised erroneously on the view that a cable system consti-
tutes a "natural monopoly" that confers market power on a cable
operator-the same rationale advanced today for common carrier
status.162 Regulators should not treat as a real or potential bottle-
neck technology a medium that, freed of some of these past re-
straints, has opened the door to expanded competition in the video
industry and holds similar promise in the area of home security,
data transmission, and other two-way services.
State or federal regulation of cable as a public utility would
add regulatory costs far in excess of any reasonable expectations of
return to the public for such regulation. In fact, premature regula-
tion of cable television's beginning steps in providing two-way ser-
vices might inhibit the financial community from making the in-
vestment in cable needed to develop these services.
160. See supra note 146.
161. See, e.g., supra note 1.
162. See, e.g., supra note 104.
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E. The Telephone Company's Anticompetitive Motivation For
Blocking Cable's Entry Into Two-Way Services
Finally, cable systems point to the lack of bona fides in tele-
phone company efforts to bring cable under the common carrier
umbrella. Telephone companies, not cable, are the true present
and potential "bottleneck facilities". Telephone companies during
the 1960's attempted to block cable's growth in ancillary services
by refusing cable systems access to telephone poles or including
clauses in telephone pole attachment contracts that bar cable oper-
ators from using the poles for purposes other than retransmission
of broadcast signals.163 The independent telephone companies,
which the 1956 AT&T Consent Decree did not bar from offering
cable service,164 often followed these refusals by constructing their
own cable television systems. The Bell operating companies com-
peted by offering channel lease services to cable companies and
discouraging independent cable operators from attaching to tele-
phone company poles.16
The FCC beginning in the mid-1960's responded to this tele-
phone company conduct with a series of actions that diminished
the competitive advantages the telephone companies enjoyed. The
FCC in 1966 ordered AT&T and GTE to file tariffs with the FCC
for cable facilities offerings, 6' began a general investigation of tele-
phone company practices in the cable field,'167 and required tele-
phone companies to obtain section 214 certificates before begin-
ning channel service. 168
The FCC in 1970 adopted an order that restricted telephone
163. See In re General Tel. Co. of Calif., 13 F.C.C.2d 448, 463 (1968), afl'd, 413 F.2d
390 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 888 (1969). ("By reason of its control over utility poles
.. . the telephone company is in a position to preclude or to substantially delay an unaffili-
ated CATV system from commencing service and thereby eliminate competition.").
164. The 1956 Consent Decree provided that the "defendant AT&T is enjoined and
restrained from engaging, either directly, or indirectly through its subsidiaries . . . in any
business other than the furnishing of common carrier communication services." United
States v. Western Electric Co., 1956 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 68,246, at 71,138.
165. See General Tel. Co. of the Southwest v. United States, 449 F.2d 846 (5th Cir.
1971). The circuit court noted that the FCC's ruling in General Telephone in part was in
response to cable operators' complaints that "the carriers favored their subsidiary CATV
companies over the independents in a variety of ways and that independents were often
required to lease channel services rather than being permitted to rent pole space." Id. at
851.
166. See Common Carrier Tarriffs for CATV Systems, 4 F.C.C.2d 257 (1966).
167. See California Water & Tel. Co., 6 F.C.C.2d 440 (1967).
168. See 47 U.S.C. § 214 (1976). This section-with certain exceptions-requires carri-
ers to obtain a certificate from the FCC before beginning new lines or extending existing
lines. See also GeneLal Tel. Co. of Calif., 13 F.C.C.2d at 450.
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companies to the offering of the facilities portion of cable televi-
sion service.16 9 The FCC currently is reviewing this rule. A 1981
FCC report on cable television cross ownership policies proposed
to retain the rule,17 0 but the United States Independent Telephone
Association recently filed a new petition to eliminate it.71 ' The
FCC has not issued a formal notice of proposed rulemaking on this
issue, but one is being prepared by the FCC staff.17 1
The telephone company-cable controversy abated somewhat
after Congress enacted legislation in 1978 that empowered the FCC
to regulate pole attachment rates in the absence of state regula-
tion.173 This history, however, indicates that, at least from the tele-
phone company perspective, cable systems pose a threat to the
telephone companies' local distribution monopoly. Implications
also exist for the telephone companies' future behavior in compet-
ing with cable under the relaxed provisions of the Justice Depart-
ment/AT&T Consent Decree.17'
The Consent Decree provides that AT&T will divest its oper-
ating telephone companies and that these operating companies will
provide only regulated communications services.17 5 The Decree also
modifies the 1956 Consent Decree by allowing AT&T to provide
services beyond common carrier communications services. The De-
cree, however, bars AT&T from offering "electronic publishing ser-
vices," presumably including most areas of traditional cable ser-
vice, for seven years.'7 6 After seven years AT&T will be able to
purchase individual systems or multiple system operators or apply
for new cable franchises.1 77 AT&T will have no market position in
local exchange services, thus these cable acquisitions may not raise
169. See Section 214 Certificates, 21 F.C.C.2d 307, recons., 22 F.C.C.2d 746 (1970),
aff'd sub nom. General Tel. Co. v. United States, 449 F.2d 846 (5th Cir. 1971).
170. F.C.C. Policy on Cable Ownership 124-25, F.C.C. Staff Report 107 (Nov. 1981)
(available in Vanderbilt Law Review office).
171. Petition for Repeal of Rule, In re Repeal of ... the Commission's Rules, F.C.C.
R.M. 4241 (Nov. 5, 1982) (available in Vanderbilt Law Review office).
172. The FCC recently relaxed the cross-ownership rules for rural, but not urban, ar-
eas. See Cross-Ownership Rules, 82 F.C.C.2d 233 (1979), recons. 82 F.C.C.2d 254 (1980),
recons. 86 F.C.C.2d 983 (1981).
173. See 47 U.S.C. § 224 (Supp. V 1981).
174. See United States v. Western Electric Co., 1982-2 TRADE CAS. (CCH) 64,900.
175. See id. at §§ 1, 2(D).
176. See id. at § 8(D). "'Electronic publishing' means the provision of any informa-
tion which AT&T or its affiliates has, or caused to be, originated, authored, compiled, col-
lected, or edited, or in which it has a direct or indirect financial or proprietary interest, and
which is disseminated to an unaffiliated person through some electronic means." Id.
177. See id. The court may deny the application and extend the seven year period if it
finds that competitive conditions require an extension.
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substantial antitrust concerns.
Cable communications provide one of the easiest vehicles for
AT&T to reenter the local distribution markets from which it is
presently foreclosed. Cable operations would allow AT&T to verti-
cally reintegrate its services. AT&T may develop cable systems-or
threaten to develop them-as a means of deterring any monopoly
power tendency of the new local operating companies.
The divested Bell operating companies may also significantly
participate in cable. The Decree restricts Bell operating companies
to the provision of common carrier local exchange services and spe-
cifically prohibits them from offering electronic information pub-
lishing services. 178 A strict reading of this provision apears to bar
the divested BOCs from providing cable software. The Decree,
however, provides a safety valve by allowing an operating company
to apply to the court for removal of the ban on providing electronic
publishing services in noncommon carrier markets if the BOC can
show that no realistic possibility exists for abuse of monopoly
power in that market. 17 9
The Bell operating companies at minimum will seek to act as
the facilities provider for new types of interactive cable services
such as electronic mail and security systems. These facilities prob-
ably will remain regulated for dominant carriers. Regulated ser-
vices, however, can be profitable, and local telephone companies
may be able to rely on their existing state franchises to offer facili-
ties for nonbroadcast "cable" services in competition with cable's
channel leasing or joint venture offerings. If the operating compa-
nies replace their current twisted-pair copper wire plant with fiber-
optic broadband capacity, they could offer these services on a basis
competitive with cable.
The present FCC cable-telephone company cross-ownership
rules only prohibit telephone companies from offering the over-
the-air broadcast services transmitted by a cable system. 180 No
present FCC rule, therefore, restricts telephone companies from
providing the nonretransmission video or nonvideo portions of
cable television service, such as pay TV, videotext, home shopping,
electronic mail and banking, energy management and security sys-
tems. Only the Consent Decree bars the operating companies from
178. See id. at § 2(D).
179. See id. at § 8(C).
180. See 47 C.F.R. § 63.54-56 (1982). This limitation resulted from the Fifth Circuit's
interpretation of the FCC's limited jurisdiction to regulate cable as ancillary to broadcast-
ing. See General Tel. Co. of the Southwest, 449 F.2d 846, 859 (5th Cir. 1971).
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providing these services.
The persuasion of state regulatory commissions to regulate
cable companies as traditional common carriers is one of the most
effective tactics available to the BOCs. If the telephone companies
are successful in this effort, regulated rates may drive capital away
from the cable industry. Moreover, if the telephone companies are
able to get cable regulated as a leased access utility, their own
channel leasing facilities offerings for both video and nonvideo ser-
vices could become a more attractive alternative than they were in
the 1960's and 1970's.181
The concerns raised by a cable operator's control of a large
number of channels pales in comparison with the first amendment
threat posed by telephone company dominance in this field. The
historical pattern of AT&T efforts to throw competitive roadblocks
in the path of cable's development demonstrates instead the dan-
gers inherent in control of all access to the home resting in one
entity, the telephone company. If the newly divested telephone
companies similarly are able exclusively to occupy large segments
of this field by burdening cable with overregulation, the public's
interest in competition and diversity in information and entertain-
ment services will suffer.
VII. PROPOSED ACTIONS To INSURE THAT CABLE REMAINS
OUTSIDE PUBLIC UTILITY REGULATION
Preemptive FCC action or federal legislation is needed to in-
sure that undue regulation does not inhibit cable's promise for de-
veloping interactive services. Contesting the actions of scores of
state regulatory commissions or local franchising authorities could
sufficiently drain the will and resources of the cable industry that a
potential competitor in the interactive services market would be
lost forever.
181. Several local telephone companies, notably C&P Telephone in Washington, D.C.,
Michigan Bell in Bloomfield Hills, and Bell of Pennsylvania in Philadelphia, recently of-
fered to construct and lease their cable facilities as part of the initial franchising process.
See Bell Units Weighing Cable TV Role, N.Y. Times, Mar. 7, 1983, § 4, at 1. A Wisconsin
telephone company has proposed a similar construction-leaseback partnership. See Wis.
Telephone Contracts to Build Cable System in Milwaukee Suburb, Communications Daily
(Oct. 25, 1983).
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A. FCC Preemption by FCC Action or Court Decision
1. Preemption Based on FCC Title I Powers
The issue of FCC preemption of state regulation of two-way
cable services arose in the Nebraska proceedings and is now before
the FCC.182 Since NARUC H is a shaky precedent, a frontal attack
on it may well succeed. In 1978, two years after the court decided
NARUC II, the Second Circuit in Brookhaven Cable TV, Inc. v.
Kelley"'5 strongly upheld the FCC's preemption of state jurisdic-
tion to regulate rates or conditions of pay cable programming offer-
ings, based on a federal policy to promote greater diversification of
program types and sources. The decision in Brookhaven, while
seemingly inconsistent with the decision in NARUC II, provides
only indirect support for a ban against state rate regulation of
cable's nonvideo ancillary services because the court in Brookha-
yen based preemptive FCC jurisdiction on the Southwestern Cable
"ancillary to broadcasting" holding.1 84 This rationale becomes
more attenuated when applied to intrastate point-to-point
nonvideo services, as both Judges Wilkey and Lumbard noted in
NARUC H1.185
Curiously, under present judicial interpretation the FCC can-
not preempt state rate regulation or required leasing of cable chan-
nels for nonvideo transmissions, but can fully preempt state and
local regulation of pay video services-apparently, under Brookha-
ven's broad language, whether these pay services are offered on an
origination, joint venture, or leased access basis. ' 86
Cable operators can attempt to link intrastate offerings suffi-
ciently intimately with interstate telecommunications that the en-
tire system requires federal preemption. Regional interconnects are
operating or proposed in the San Francisco Bay area, Atlanta, Chi-
182. See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
183. 573 F.2d 765 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 904 (1979).
184. See id. at 767. The court also relied upon United States v. Midwest Video Corp.,
406 U.S. 649 (1972) in which the Supreme Court approved the FCC's mandatory cable origi-
nation rules as "reasonably ancillary" to "the achievement of long-established regulatory
goals in the field of television broadcasting." 406 U.S. at 667-68. The Brookhaven court
reasoned that "[i]t follows that the FCC may regulate cable TV if its regulation will further
a goal which it is entitled to pursue in the broadcast area." Brookhaven, 573 F.2d at 767.
185. See supra notes 89-95 and accompanying text.
186. See supra part IV. The Second Circuit also has upheld FCC preemption of state
regulation of master antenna television systems on the ground that state regulation could
impede interstate multipoint distribution services (MDS) used for pay television. See New
York State Comm'n on Cable Tel. v. FCC, 669 F.2d 58 (2d Cir. 1982).
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cago, and Boston.187 Creation of a multistate regional interconnect
of cable interactive services may be sufficient to allow cable to raise
the linkage argument that Judge Wright found persuasive in
NARUC I. 18 The FCC also could premise preemption of cable
regulation on its ancillary powers in Title I of the Communications
Act not only to carry out its Title III broadcasting objectives, but
also its Title II common carrier objectives, even where one portion
of a cable system's two-way services are transmitted entirely
intrastate. 8 9
2. Preemption of "Enhanced Services"
Cable operators also could attempt to obtain a clear FCC or
judicial ruling identifying the cable interactive services that are
"enhanced services" under the FCC's Computer Inquiry 11 deci-
sion.1 0 The FCC has characterized basic service as the mere
"transmission pipeline" through which unprocessed and unmodi-
fied information passes from one source to another.' 9' "Informa-
tion storage and retrieval services," whether data or voice, are not
subject to FCC Title II regulation when offered on an interstate
basis or to state regulation when offered intrastate. 192 The D.C.
187. See Applications of Northeast Interconnect, FCC File Nos. 3572/76-CF-P-82
(July 13, 1982) (available in Vanderbilt Law Review office) (application for five point-to-
point microwave stations to interconnect cable systems in eastern Massachusetts). The fear
that this linkage would occur led Northwestern Bell to file against Cox Cable's DTS links
for Omaha, Tuscon, and Vancouver. See supra note 128.
188. See NARUC II, 533 F.2d at 631; supra note 96 and accompanying text.
189. See Comments of Cablevision Systems Development Company, In re Cox Cable
Communications, Inc., No. CCB DFB 83-1 (July 1, 1983).
190. Second Computer Inquiry, 77 F.C.C.2d 384, recons. 84 F.C.C.2d 50 (1980), recons.
88 F.C.C.2d 512 (1981).
191. See Computer Inquiry II, 84 F.C.C.2d 50, 54 (1980).
192. Id. at 55. The FCC in response to AT&T's argument that classifying voice storage
services as enhanced would inhibit the development of "advanced calling" and "call answer-
ing" services stated:
[T]hese offerings present only a small sample of the type of voice storage related ser-
vices that may be offered consumers .... To alter the basic category as suggested by
AT&T and GTE would be to bring within the scope of basic service a host of com-
puter-based voice storage and retrieval applications and customer-interactive services
that far exceed basic transmission and related switching and routing functions. Not
only might this require common carrier regulation of such services under Title II, but it
would undermine any workable demarcation as to the boundary between basic and en-
hanced services. Technological advances are negating network differentiation of voice
or non-voice transmissions .... This compels that any enduring and workable demar-
cation between basic and enhanced services exclude information storage and retrieval
services-both voice and data-from the basic category.
Id.; see also 88 F.C.C.2d at 541 n.34; GTE's Telenet Communications Corp., 91 F.C.C.2d
232, 237 (1982).
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Circuit Court of Appeals last fall sweepingly upheld the FCC's pre-
emption of all enhanced telecommunications services.'93
To come within the Computer Inquiry II preemption, cable
systems should insure that their services combine data processing
and communications services in a manner falling within the FCC's
definition of "enhanced." Services that offer the subscriber the
ability to alter the form, content, or delivery of information under
the subscriber's control, or involve "subscriber interaction with
stored information,1 9 4 are enhanced. The FCC gave as an example
of enhanced service AT&T's "Dial It" service in which subscribers
dial a certain number to gain access to stored sports scores. 95
Many cable interactive services operate on a similar model.
The Computer Inquiry II decision appears to have resolved
the issue whether a state could regulate the rates or conditions for
a cable system's offer of interactive terminals to its subscribers.
The FCC decision clearly establishes that the offering of customer
premises equipment is not a common carrier activity subject to ei-
ther federal or state regulation.19 If the telephone company offers
these terminals, the offering does not require uniform tariffed rates
or availability to all customers. 97
3. Preemption Based on Competitive Carrier Classification
Scheme
If the FCC does not consider certain cable service offerings to
be enhanced, the cable industry can make a broader preemption
argument based on the FCC's adoption of a broad classification
scheme for "dominant" and "non-dominant" carriers in Competi-
tive Carrier Rulemaking. 98 The FCC has found public utility reg-
ulation of firms without market power' 99 to be contrary to the pub-
lic interest. Under this theory, if present or potential future
193. See Computer and Communications Indus. Ass'n. v. FCC, 693 F.2d 198 (D.C. Cir.
1982), cert. denied, 51 U.S.L.W. 3826 (1983).
194. Computer Inquiry II, 77 F.C.C.2d at 387.
195. See Computer Inquiry H, 84 F.C.C.2d at 55.
196. See id. at 65 ("[T]here is generally no dispute that CPE (customer premises
equipment) should be provided on a competitive base. Given this, the issue before us, and
the one receiving substantial comment on reconsideration, is the manner in which CPE
should be deregulated.").
197. See Computer and Communications Indus. Ass'n v. FCC, 693 F.2d 206-14; Sec-
ond Computer Inquiry, 84 F.C.C.2d at 67 ("As of this date new CPE and associated mainte-
nance must be separated from a carrier's basic service and offered on a nonregulated basis").
198. 85 F.C.C.2d 1 (1981); see also supra notes 151-159 and accompanying text.
199. "Market power" is a firm's ability "to raise and maintain its prices above cost,
including an allowance of a fair profit." Second Computer Inquiry, 84 F.C.C.2d at 450.
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competition acts as a check on prices, the FCC has determined
that common carrier rate and service regulation should be re-
moved.200 Competition is present, at minimum from the telephone
company, to all or virtually all of cable's emerging services.
The FCC, explicitly warning that state action must not inter-
fere with its deregulatory approach to competitive carriers, stated
in 1981:
We do not intend, by concluding that non-dominant communications entities
are not subject to regulation as common carriers, to be merely opening the
way for state commissions to impose that same kind of regulation. We have
found that regulation inhibits the market forces which we believe will best
serve federal communications policies and goals .... We intend to preclude
the states from regulating non-dominant entities providing communications
services in competitive markets on an interstate basis.
20 1
This language should give cable another argument to use in seek-
ing FCC preemption of their nondominant service offerings.0 2
B. Legislative Action to Preempt State or Local Public Utility
Regulation
A second strategy cable can use to achieve federal preemption
is to promote passage of legislation placing at the federal level all
jurisdiction over cable interactive services. United States Senator
Barry Goldwater, Chairman of the Senate Communications Sub-
committee, introduced a bill proposing federal jurisdiction early in
1983.203 The Goldwater bill is a comprehensive effort to establish
in the Communications Act for the first time direct federal juris-
diction over cable television and a national policy to promote cable
development, thus removing the need to justify cable regulation
under the existing "ancillary to broadcasting" theory.
The bill, which underwent substantial revision before passage
by the Senate in June 1983,204 originally required cable operators
to set aside a number of channels for free and leased access. The
amended Senate bill leaves the leased access area to agreement be-
200. See id. at 449. ("[T]he mechanisms Congress adopted in Title II are designed to
be employed to limit the conduct of dominant firms and. . ., conversely, they are not effec-
tive, in the sense that they do not directly vary economic performance, when employed with
respect to the conduct of firms without market power.").
201. Id. at 519.
202. See Competitive Carrier Rulemaking, 91 F.C.C.2d 60 n.22 (1982)(discussion of
FCC's ability to forbear from common carrier regulation of cable).
203. The Telecommunications Act of 1983, S. 66, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., (1983).
204. See 129 CONG. REc. S8325-28 (daily ed. June 14, 1983). The revision was the
result of a compromise between the National Cable Television Association and the National
League of Cities. See N.Y. Times, July 16, 1983, § 4, at 12.
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tween the cable systems and municipalities as part of franchise
negotiations. °5
The bill, however, specifically bans states and municipalities
from regulating or restricting offerings by cable systems of two-way
telecommunications services, except for basic telephone service.206
The cable industry succeeded in having Congress define "basic
telephone service" narrowly, restricting it to actual provision of
switched voice service. The bill as passed allows state and local
regulation of "two-way voice grade communications that is held
out to the public and that would be subject to regulation by the
Commission or any State if offered by a common carrier subject, in
whole or in part, to title II of this Act.
20 7
Congress should expand this legislation clearly to preempt all
state and local regulation of cable's interactive services, including
two-way voice communications. Cable is unlikely to become a dom-
inant carrier of switched voice traffic in the foreseeable future.
Thus, federal policy should allow cable to experiment in voice mar-
kets, as well as in other interactive markets, without immediately
imposing rate and entry obligations. That a service "looks like"
something the telephone company offers is no reason to regulate it
in the same manner. The real concern in regulation is market
power, and cable is even farther from possessing that power in the
voice market than it is in data, banking, shopping, and home
security.208
The Senate bill contains a residual conflict because it allows
leased access channel agreements between cable companies and
cities, 209 but prohibits states or municipalities from utility rate reg-
205. S. REP. No. 98-67, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1983). Section 606(b) before amend-
ment stated that "[a]ny cable system operator subject to subsection (a) of this section, shall
dedicate or set aside for access, from available channels, 10 percent of such available chan-
nels for use by public, educational, or governmental channel programmers."
206. S. 66 § 607(g)(1). States may require cable operators to file "informational tariffs"
for other types of "intrastate telecommunications services," but may not reject or modify
them, or otherwise restrict cable's entry into these markets. S. 66 § 607(g)(2)(A).
207. S. 66 § 603(2).
208. The cable industry accepted a compromise in S. 66 providing that states "shall
deregulate" all providers of data and other intrastate telecommunications services (other
than basic telephone service) if they find that these services are subject to "effective compe-
tition." S. 66 § 607(g)(3). This would let the telephone companies enter nonvoice markets on
an untariffed, unregulated basis once cable and other competing systems obtained a foot-
hold. ("Effective competition" is defined in detail in S. 66 § 607(g)(4)). Cable's fear of let-
ting telephone companies participate immediately in these markets on an unregulated basis
is based on the telephone companies' ability to cross-subsidize low rates to business users
from their monopoly in the local exchange residential market.
209. See S. 66 §§ 606(a), 613(c).
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ulation of these channels. 210 The cities that find cable operators do
not meet their leased access commitments thus may only be able
to find the cable operator in breach of its franchise obligations and
remove the franchise or impose fines on the operator. Without
first-come, first-served tariff regulation, however, cities will have
difficulty creating a clear, reviewable standard by which to deter-
mine whether cable companies have unreasonably withheld leased
access to competing data or security services.
This legislation, making its way through Congress, has at-
tracted attention from newspapers, banks, security alarm compa-
nies and other potential vendors of both programming and non-
programming services who want to lease cable channels to reach
homes and businesses. These interested parties have placed in-
creased pressure on cable to accept more limitations on its edito-
rial rights to deal with independent programmers and interactive
service providers. The parallel bill that House Telecommunications
Subcommittee Chariman Timothy Wirth introduced in October
1983, H.R. 4103,211 contains a sliding scale of channel set asides for
leased access based on the size of a cable system's overall channel
capacity.2 2 As introduced, however, H.R. 4103 restricts these
leased access provisions to "video programming," and does not re-
quire access for data and other nonvideo interactive services. 213
Any compromise, however, that invites the states and locali-
ties to play a role in this process runs the risk of subjecting cable's
editorial and business decisions to a patchwork of conflicting re-
quirements and regulatory schemes. Cable should continue to press
for full legislative deregulation of this area. If this is not possible,
then federal preemption, with residual FCC authority to police un-
reasonably denied leased access, may be preferable to fixed statu-
tory set asides. Such a scheme would mandate that the FCC for-
bear from immediate regulation and would allow it to impose
regulation should cable become a "dominant" or "bottleneck" fa-
cility with market power in the interactive, nonservice area.
The issue of cable's emerging role as a provider of two-way
business and home services will remain the focal point of cable's
agenda in the 1980's. The answers hammered out between the
210. See id. at § 614.
211. H.R. 4103, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (Oct. 6, 1983).
212. See, e.g., id. at § 613.
213. H.R. 4103, § 602 (12) defines video programming as "programming provided by or
generally considered comparabale to programming carried by a television broadcast
station."
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cable industry, the states, the cities, the FCC, and Congress will
determine whether regulators will extend to this medium the pro-
competitive policies present in other telecommunications fields, or
whether cable's promise as more than a pure entertainment me-
dium will remain unfulfilled as a result of unnecessary regulatory
barriers.

